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The high volume of foreclosures during and following the Great
Recession in the United States led to the revelation of many troubling
lending practices. It also led to problematic judicial decisions that
erode borrower protection by curtailing or eliminating procedural
requirements and substantive defenses with respect to foreclosure. This
Article examines the treatment of statute of limitation and res judicata
defenses after a loan has been accelerated following a borrower
default. Some courts ignore the traditional rule that acceleration under
a contract starts the clock for statute of limitation purposes or that
acceleration consolidates the loan instrument into a single obligation
as opposed to an installment obligation. Instead, these courts have
permitted lenders to accelerate loans repeatedly without triggering the
statute of limitations or res judicata defenses. Consequently, lenders
are permitted to assert foreclosure claims with respect to the same
underlying debt amount over and over again. Rather than being used
as a last resort, acceleration and the subsequent foreclosure process
can now be wielded as a significant threat to borrowers throughout the
life of their home loan. Consistent with favoritism demonstrated in our
prior research, we argue that creating exceptions for lenders in the
application of statutes of limitation and res judicata defenses provides
little incentive for banks and servicers to reform questionable lending
and collection practices.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the treatment of statute of limitation and res
judicata defenses after a loan has been accelerated following a default
and is in foreclosure. The Great Recession resulted in a sizable wave
of foreclosures that led commentators to compare the era (and the policy
responses) to the Great Depression.' The enormous amount of cases
filed placed a strain on courts, court administrators, legislators, and of
course the parties to these suits.2 This strain meant delayed resolutions
for thousands of cases.' This increased caseload meant that many state
1 See, e.g., Monica D. Armstrong, From the Great Depression to the Current
Housing Crisis: What Code Section 108 Tells Us About Congress's Response to
Economic Crisis, 26 AKRON TAX J. 69, 97, 105 (2011).
2 See generally Aleatra P. Williams, Foreclosing Foreclosure: Escaping the
Yawning Abyss of the Deep Mortgage and Housing Crisis, 7 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y
455, 470-71 (2012) (discussing the effects of the large amount of foreclosure cases
on courts and legislatures following the Great Recession).
3 Krista Franks Brock, Moody 's: Foreclosure Timelines on the Rise; More
Losses to RMBS, DSNEws, http://dsnews.com/news/foreclosure/03-23-
2012/moodys-foreclosure-timelines-on-rise-more-losses-to-rmbs-2012-03-23 (last
visited Mar. 27, 2018) (noting that judicial foreclosure timelines average 654 days,
whereas non-judicial foreclosures age an average of 297 days).
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court systems were inundated with an untenable number of cases that
few judges wanted to hear.4 With many court systems' funding tied to
case clearance numbers, courts and court administrators attempted
numerous changes in an effort to process thousands of cases efficiently
and fairly.'
Some of these procedures were aimed at diverting parties from
litigation and, for example, encouraging or even mandating early
mediation.6 Although some scholars have argued that certain efforts
were successful,7 other research suggests that these programs were not
a panacea because banks and their representatives attending mediations
often lacked the authority to settle, basic information about the given
case at hand, and basic flexibility, such as the ability to
contemporaneously review borrower financial information as a basis to
provide an offer of settlement. 8
Aside from diversion programs aimed at moving parties towards
settlement early in the foreclosure process, courts also set up additional
court procedures and structures to process the large number of
foreclosures. 9 These procedures included, for example, temporarily
rehiring additional retired judges to help process the cases and setting
up trial and summary judgment calendars with hundreds of cases
scheduled during a single day or afternoon. 10 While such actions
undoubtedly assisted in reducing the number of pending foreclosure
cases, the creation of parallel or shadow court systems strictly for
foreclosure matters meant that borrowers' counselors were met with
4 See, e.g., Andrew J. Kazakes, Protecting Absent Stakeholders in Foreclosure
Litigation: The Foreclosure Crisis, Mortgage Modification, and State Court
Responses, 43 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1383, 1401 (2010) (describing how this
overwhelming increase in caseload has led to rubber stamping and an abbreviated
foreclosure process).
' See, e.g., Greg Allen, Fast-Paced Foreclosures: Florida's 'Rocket Docket',
NPR (Oct. 21, 2010, 4:17 PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld-130729666 (describing a
Florida court which hears about 200 foreclosure cases a day).
6 Alan M. White, Foreclosure Diversion and Mediation in the States, 33 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 411, 412, 415 (2017).
7 See id. at 412, 416.
8 Adolfo Pesquera, State Mediation Program Helps Few Homeowners, DAILY
Bus. REv. (June 29, 2011, 12:00 AM),
https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/almID/1202498811107/State-mediation-
program-helps-few-homeowners/ ("There were 63,019 mortgage holders eligible for
mediation between the program's launch in March 2010 and the end of the year. Of
those, there were 26,150 reported contacts and 8,669 mediations conducted.
Mediations leading to some sort of agreement totaled 2,309, or 3.7 percent of the
eligible population.").
9 Allen, supra note 5.
10 Id.
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immense judicial skepticism, with pressure to conduct trials in
extremely short amounts of time, and with limited judicial consideration
of cases.11 The lack of safeguards for litigants triggered harsh criticism,
including accusations of implementing procedures that "almost
uniformly disadvantage homeowners. "12
At a bare minimum, faster foreclosure case processing times meant
that judges often ignored or did not have sufficient time to devote to
accusations of fraud and other unethical behavior by foreclosing entities
and their attorneys.13 Furthermore, research suggests that courts across
the country, and not merely in the states with the highest number of
foreclosures, have systematically reduced the availability of debtor
defenses, debtor discovery, and consequences to banks for fraud upon
courts. 14 Not only that, but even years into the foreclosure crisis, some
courts lack basic understanding of how modern mortgage developments
function. 1
The judicial practice of "previewing" foreclosure cases, discussed
in our previous research, also creates additional problems. 16
Previewing occurs where judges begin a foreclosure case or decision,
regardless of the actual issue being appealed or argued, by noting that a
default under a note has not been disputed, or that a certain party has
not made a mortgage payment in a certain amount of time. 17 This
11 Petition for Writ of Certiorari or Writ of Prohibition at 2, Merrigan v. Bank of
N.Y. Mellon, 64 So. 3d 685 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (No. 09-CA-055758), 2011
Fla. App. LEXIS 11139.
12 Id. at 13.
13 See id. at 16, 33-34.
14 See Eric A. Zacks & Dustin A. Zacks, Not a Party: Challenging Mortgage
Assignments, 59 ST. Louis U. L.J. 175, 179-83 (2014) [hereinafter Not a Party].
15 In the case of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), for
example, a company expressly created not to physically possess, store, or hold
promissory notes has repeatedly explained that it is never the holder of promissory
notes. See Frequently Asked Questions, MERS, https://www.mersinc.org/about/faq
(last visited Apr. 3, 2018). Despite MERS itself admitting it does not hold notes,
this has not dissuaded courts from proclaiming exactly the opposite. See, e.g.,
Taylor v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 44 So. 3d 618, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
(concluding that MERS could arguably be a holder of promissory notes).
16 See Dustin A. Zacks, Standing in Our Own Sunshine: Reconsidering
Standing, Transparency, and Accuracy in Foreclosures, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 551,
571 (2011) [hereinafter Standing in Our Own Sunshine] ("[M]any courts will
correctly assume that a lender or successor owner would not buy a MERS loan if it
did not assent to MERS remaining its nominee with the associated rights to
foreclose.").
17 See generally Eric A. Zacks & Dustin A. Zacks, A Standing Question:
Mortgages, Assignment, and Foreclosure, 40 J. CORP. L. 706, 727 (2015)
[hereinafter A Standing Question] (explaining how "previewing" is not unique to a
particular type of claim).
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previewing almost always is followed by a rejection of the borrowers'
legal arguments. The judicial reaction to the foreclosure crisis thus
appears largely disinterested in procedural safeguards for debtors and
generally disposed toward the interests of banks and lenders.I"
Mixed empirical data shows the possibility that reducing case
numbers at the expense of basic due process might still be seen as a net
gain for the wellbeing of the public and of the economy. For example,
some research offers that additional foreclosure processing time results
in lenders making future credit offers more expensive. 19 Similarly,
other data produced during the Great Recession shows that greatly
elongated foreclosure time frames, by providing an opportunity for
continuing dilapidation of properties and neighborhoods, might
increase crime and decrease surrounding property values.20
Whatever economic and societal benefits have been made by the
acceleration of foreclosure procedures and the short attention given to
foreclosure cases, quicker judicial foreclosures gave cover to a wide
variety of bank and lender malfeasance.21 Courts largely failed to
address or remedy the many allegations of robo-signing, service of
process deficiencies, forced-placed insurance scams, and other
problematic practices that came to light during the foreclosure boom.2 2
The lack of oversight, whether willful or not, reflected poorly on courts
when it was revealed that thousands of fraudulent or perjured
documents had been filed in litigation around the country, when
attorneys general instituted revealing investigations into high volume
foreclosure law firms, when national banks and government-sponsored
enterprises were forced to halt foreclosures to internally assess their
foreclosure practices, and when certain lenders ultimately paid millions
in fines arising from their foreclosure practices.23
As mentioned, a corollary to, or perhaps an outgrowth from, court
systems' general orientation towards speeding up foreclosure cases has
18 See Not a Party, supra note 14, at 179, 182, 186.
19 Dustin A. Zacks, The Grand Bargain: Pro-Borrower Responses to the
Housing Crisis and Implications for Future Lending and Homeownership, 57 LoY.
L. REv. 541, 562 (2011).
21 Id. at 546-54.
21 A Standing Question, supra note 17, at 706.
22 See, e.g., Dustin A. Zacks, Robo-Litigation, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 867, 891-
92 (2013) [hereinafter Robo-Litigation] (examining judges' muted reactions to
misconduct in response to the foreclosure crisis).
23 See id. at 875-76, 878, 884-90, 904-05 (describing multiple instances of
attorney misconduct in light of the foreclosure crisis); David Dayen, Another Slap on
the Wrist for a Company That Abused Homeowners, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 20,
2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/1 1601 0/ocwen-mortgage-fraud-settlement-
servicer-fined-homeowner-abuse.
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been the systematic narrowing of borrower defenses.24 In response to
debtor defenses related to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
Inc. ("MERS") and its capacity to foreclose, or to assign, transfer, or
negotiate mortgage notes, courts largely deferred to whatever argument
MERS sought to assert. 25 Again, this occurred despite publicly
available evidence that MERS and its attorneys were propounding
diametrically opposing positions to courts around the country regarding
exactly what ownership or agency interest, if any, MERS held.26
Courts, accordingly, generally acceded to MERS's ascendance as a
prominent placeholder on the public record of millions of homes and to
the detriment of hundreds of years of traditional recording rules, despite
the fact that MERS was created undemocratically by private parties
(including banks and lenders) expressly for the purpose of avoiding
statutory recording requirements.27
In other related areas of contentious foreclosure litigation, courts
also tended to downplay or ignore borrower defenses based on faulty
assignments of notes and mortgages.28 Although standing is a primary
defense against a foreclosing entity that did not make the original loan,
many courts not only downplayed such defenses based on assignment
issues, but they also refused to allow discovery on assignments and
transfers of their mortgage loan.29 Again, this general trend appears to
have ignored the readily available evidence that thousands of
assignments were fraudulent or otherwise problematic. 0
This Article extends this previous body of research to yet another
area of defense to foreclosure and debt in which judges appear to
proceed along the same continuum described above. We examine the
treatment of statute of limitation and res judicata defenses after a loan
has been accelerated following a default. Some courts have ignored the
traditional rule that acceleration under a contract starts the clock for
statute of limitation purposes or that acceleration consolidates the loan
instrument into a single obligation as opposed to many separate
installment obligations. 1 Instead, these courts have permitted lenders
to accelerate loans repeatedly without triggering the statute of
24 See A Standing Question, supra note 17, at 708-11.
25 See, e.g., Standing in Our Own Sunshine, supra note 16, at 570.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 A Standing Question, supra note 17, at 708.
29 See id. at 711.
30 See id.
31 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 5 (describing "shortcuts" that some courts have
taken to "hear[] as many as 200 foreclosure cases each day" that "deny many
homeowners their right to due process").
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limitations or res judicata defenses. 32 Consequently, lenders are
permitted to assert foreclosure claims with respect to the same
underlying debt amount over and over again.33 Rather than being used
as a last resort, acceleration and the subsequent foreclosure process can
now be wielded as a significant threat to borrowers throughout the life
of their home loan.34
When presented with new and novel statute of limitations and res
judicata defenses to foreclosure, courts have again shown their
propensity to preview and predict the ultimate outcome of a lender's
claim before wrestling with whatever legal issue is actually being
appealed or argued.35 Such previews inevitably damage homeowners
and result in exceptions and special treatment for banks, lenders,
servicers, and other foreclosing entities. 36 Such decisions provide
another powerful example of courts ignoring longstanding procedural
and substantive rules in favor of foreclosing entities in the name of
judicial expediency.37
As we have done in previous research, we argue that this
continuation of courts' general anti-homeowner orientation, even in the
face of years of lender malfeasance, produces serious negative
externalities.38 Just as judicial refusal to entertain robo-signing claims
or to grant discovery on such issues gave cover to high-volume
foreclosure firms and their clients and kept questionable ethical
practices in the dark for years, new exceptions for banks and lenders in
the application of statutes of limitation and res judicata defenses have
provided little incentive for banks and servicers to reform questionable
32 See Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1006-07 (Fla. 2004).
33 See id. at 1007-08 ("[A]n acceleration and foreclosure predicated upon
subsequent and different defaults present a separate and distinct issue .... The ends
of justice require that the doctrine of res judicata not be applied so strictly as to
prevent mortgagees from being able to challenge multiple defaults on a mortgage.").
34 See David Hahn, The Roles ofAcceleration, 8 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 229,
244 (2010) ("Acceleration is the means of action. Through its right to accelerate the
debt, the creditor can materialize the consequences of a covenant violation and inflict
severe harm to the borrower's operations and survival as a viable entity. It is the
ultimate threat of a creditor against the borrower .... ").
" Joseph K. Gilligan, Note, Acceleration Clauses in Notes and Mortgages, 88
U. PA. L. REV. 94, 107-10 (1939).
36 Id. at 109.
37 Id.
38 Id.; see generally A Standing Question, supra note 17, at 730 ("Encouraging
more settlements benefits society as a whole, particularly those jurisdictions that
have had higher numbers of foreclosures. This is because preventing foreclosures
can help eliminate significant negative externalities. The normal neighborhood-level
effects of foreclosed homes are significant in terms of crime, blight, and reduced
property values.").
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lending or foreclosure practices. '9 Because these court-created
exceptions can revive a bank's claim that was previously dismissed in
part because the foreclosure was questionable, we again argue that
courts have continued to contribute to the many problematic ways in
which banks litigate foreclosure cases.
II. STATE LAW TREATMENT OF ACCELERATION CLAUSES, RES
JUDICATA AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Acceleration clauses are contractual provisions designed to provide
lenders with additional protection in the event that a borrower
repeatedly fails to pay.40 These clauses provide, either automatically or
at the option of the lender, for the entire loan amount to become due and
payable following a default under the note, such as a borrower's failure
to make a monthly payment.41
In the absence of an acceleration clause, a lender would be forced to
bring separate claims against the borrower each time the borrower failed
to make an additional monthly payment (since each monthly payment
would not otherwise be due until the stated due date in the promissory
note). 42 An acceleration clause also is helpful to lenders because it
provides them with an opportunity to exit the transaction immediately
(by accelerating the loan and foreclosing) once the borrower's ability to
pay is threatened. 43 This could be more advantageous than waiting until
'9 See Robo-Litigation, supra note 22, at 869.
4 See Gilligan, supra note 35, at 95 (describing the evolution of acceleration
clauses during the nineteenth century).
41 Mitchell v. Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis, 174 S.W.2d 671, 676-77 (Ark.
1943) (describing various formulations of acceleration clauses); Gilligan, supra note
35, at 109 ("They contend that the acceleration clause is for the benefit of the
creditor-it is another arrow in his quiver. The debtor has done wrong. He has
defaulted.").
42 Gilligan, supra note 35, at 94 ("It is universally accepted that the failure of a
mortgagor to meet installments of principal or interest, or to pay taxes, assessments
and insurance will not cause the whole debt to mature at once upon default, absent a
provision in the bond or mortgage to that effect."); Hahn, supra note 34, at 231 ("A
priori, acceleration may be conceived as an enforcement clause, facilitating the
collection of the loan. By modifying the original terms of the agreement and making
the entire amount payable on demand, the creditor may move forward and use
collection measures sanctioned by the applicable debtor-creditor law. In this sense,
acceleration is an accessory of the contractual remedy of enforcement.").
43 See, e.g., 9 ALFRED TARTAGLIA, WARREN'S WEED NEw YORK REAL
PROPERTY § 95.50[12] (Matthew Bender 2018) ("Acceleration clauses have been
used in mortgage instruments and deemed valid and enforceable in a wide range of
conditions. The most common provisions for acceleration of the mortgage debt
result from the mortgagor's failure to pay an installment of principal or interest; or
the failure to pay taxes, water rates, or assessments; or the failure of the mortgagor to
keep the premises insured." (citations omitted)); Hahn, supra note 34, at 231 ("A
continued...
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the borrower breaches each monthly payment obligation before the
entire loan amount is due, at which point the borrower may have no
ability to pay and the underlying property may be worth less.44
The implicit threat of acceleration is also important with respect to
deterring borrower default.4 ' Borrowers know that if they breach one
monthly installment, the entire loan may become due and they could
lose the house in foreclosure.46 This provides borrowers with incentives
to pay regularly.47 The threat of loan acceleration can also be useful in
pre-foreclosure negotiations with buyers who are delinquent with
respect to their monthly payment obligations.48 Disclosures mandated
in many form mortgages attempt to dull the sharp blade of acceleration,
including specific language that informs borrowers that the entire
amount of the loan might be demanded presently at once if a default is
not cured.49
One issue that has divided courts is how to rule on attempts by
lenders to accelerate the loan and bring foreclosure proceedings in
repetitive fashion. 0 This Article addresses two approaches regarding
how particular defenses should apply once a loan has been accelerated
but the original claim for breach of the promissory note is dismissed or
otherwise lost. For example, if a first action on a note accelerated by
second entity a creditor must worry about, which has been widely neglected by the
financial literature, are other self-interested creditors who rush to dismantle the
common debtor upon the latter's financial distress. Creditors whose claims are
payable in the future lack the fundamental legal tools to practically protect their
interests against a run on the debtor's assets.").
44 SCOTT T. TROSS, NEw JERSEY FORECLOSURE LAW & PRACTICE 4-5 (N.J. Law
Journal Books 2001) ("Most mortgages contain acceleration clauses, which give the
mortgagee the right to foreclose the entire indebtedness in the event the mortgagor
defaults under the loan documents. Where the mortgage contains such a clause, the
mortgagee is authorized to require payment of the entire mortgage debt upon default.
Absent an acceleration clause, the mortgagee is without power to alter the maturity
date of the outstanding principal balance of the loan upon default.").
45 Hahn, supra note 34, at 244 ("Acceleration is the means of action ....
Absent the creditor's contractual power to call the entire loan back the force of the
covenants would diminish. A borrower who is aware of the limited enforcement
options of its creditors would attach a lower price tag to a potential covenant
violation. Acceleration is, thus, the complementary measure that adds credibility to
the covenants' intended deterrence. It perfects the threat by signaling to the




49 See, e.g., FANNIE MAE, MORTGAGE UNIFORM INSTRUMENT 22,
https://www.fanniemae.com/singlefamily/security-instruments (last visited Apr. 3,
2018).
51 See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d 987, 990 (Ohio 2008); see
also Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1005-06 (Fla. 2004).
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the lender was dismissed, but the borrower subsequently breaches
again, should the lender be permitted to accelerate and sue on the note
again? Ordinarily, claims litigated and lost on the merits cannot be
brought again under the doctrine ofresjudicata.51 Secondly, if the party
accelerated the note but took too long to file or attempt to refile its claim,
the applicable statute of limitations could prevent a claim from being
brought.5
2
In the foreclosure context, the issue often turns on whether the
earlier and subsequent claims for breach and acceleration are treated as
one and the same.53 If the two claims for breach are deemed to be the
"same," then the doctrine of res judicata may apply and prevent the
lender from attempting to collect on the loan "again" if the lender lost
the first claim on the merits.54 Similarly, if the lender accelerated the
loan but did not pursue its claim in a timely fashion, the statute of
limitations may bar subsequent claims for breach and acceleration.55 If
the two claims are treated as separate and distinct claims, however, then
neither res judicata nor the statute of limitations will apply, and the
lender will be permitted to accelerate the entire loan again based upon
subsequent breaches of the promissory note and pursue foreclosure.56
This section describes how different courts approach this issue.
A. One Bite at the Apple
The traditional rule in installment contracts, such as home loans, is
that individual breaches of installment obligations are treated
separately, but that acceleration of the entire amount due following a
breach under the installment contract changes that treatment.5 7 Many
cases hold that once acceleration of the entire home loan occurs, the
entire outstanding indebtedness under the promissory note should be
treated as becoming due (by nature of the acceleration clause) and, more
51 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 48 (AM. LAW INST. 1942).
52 H. A. Wood, Annotation, Acceleration Provision in Note or Mortgage as
Affecting the Running of the Statute of Limitations, 161 A.L.R. 1211 (1946).
3 See Singleton, 882 So. 2d at 1008.
4 See Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, Inc. 150 So. 2d 468, 471 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963).
55 See Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Beauvais, No. 3D14-575, 2014 Fla. App.
LEXIS 20422, at *20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2014), rev'd on reh 'g en banc,
188 So. 3d 938 (2016).
56 See Singleton, 882 So. 2d at 1008.
51 9 TARTAGLIA, supra note 43, § 95.50[1] ("An acceleration clause in a
mortgage, bond or note will generally provide that all unpaid principal, along with
any accrued interest and other charges, becomes immediately due and payable upon
the happening of any condition or conditions specified in the instrument.").
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importantly, as indivisible.58 This means that if a lender accelerates the
loan and loses on the merits, then the lender cannot sue again, even if
the borrower subsequently "defaults" by not making a monthly
payment. Courts so holding have relied upon res judicata, which
provides that:
[T]he judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction
directly upon a matter is conclusive between the same
parties as to that matter when drawn in question in
another court. The rule rests on the ground that once a
party has litigated, or has had the opportunity to litigate,
the same matter in a court of competent jurisdiction, that
party or its privy should not be permitted to litigate it
again to the harassment and vexation of its adversary. 60
Res judicata, then, exists to prevent harassment of a person when a
claim was already litigated or could have been litigated in another
court.6 I Without it, claimants could simply attempt to bring their claims
in different jurisdictions until finding one that agrees with them.6 2 This
is particularly important with regard to mortgage contracts, where the
disparity in bargaining power and litigation resources is vast. 63
58 See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d 987, 990 (Ohio 2008); see
also Johnson v. Samson Constr. Corp., 704 A.2d 866, 869 (Me. 1997).
59 See Johnson, 704 A.2d at 869; see also Stadler, 150 So. 2d at 472-73.
60 John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Proper Test to Determine Identity of Claims
for Purposes of Claim Preclusion by Res Judicata Under Federal Law, 82 A.L.R.
Fed. 829, Art. 1 § 2(a) (1987); see also, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231 (2017) ("A
judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any
subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and
determined if its determination was essential to that judgment."); VA. SuP. CT. R. 1:6
(2018) ("A party whose claim for relief arising from identified conduct, a
transaction, or an occurrence, is decided on the merits by a final judgment, shall be
forever barred from prosecuting any second or subsequent civil action against the
same opposing party or parties on any claim or cause of action that arises from that
same conduct, transaction or occurrence .... ").
61 1 RICHARD W. BOURNE & JOHN A. LYNCH, JR., MODERN MARYLAND CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 12.2(a) (3d ed. 2017) ("[A] judgment between the same parties and
their privies is a final bar to any other suit upon the same cause of action, and is
conclusive not only as to all matters that have been decided in the original suit, but
as to all matters which with propriety could have been litigated in the first suit ......
(citation omitted)).
62 Wagner, Jr., supra note 60, § 2(a) ("Claim preclusion will therefore apply to
bar a subsequent action on res judicata principles where parties or their privies have
previously litigated the same claim to a valid final judgment. In most cases, the key
question to be answered in adjudging the propriety of a claim preclusion defense
appears to be whether in fact the claim in the second action is 'the same as,' or
'identical to,' one upon which the parties have previously proceeded to judgment.").
63 See Frank S. Alexander et al., Legislative Responses to the Foreclosure Crisis
continued...
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Typically, res judicata analysis turns on a court's determination
regarding whether the subsequent claim arises out of the same
transaction that was the subject of the earlier claim. 64
Accordingly, under traditional application, once the entire
indebtedness had been accelerated and had become due, then the
borrower only had one contractual obligation: to pay the entire loan
amount. 65 The lender's failure to prevail with respect to the borrower's
breach of that singular contractual obligation could therefore doom
future claims against the borrower, even if those future claims related
to subsequent monthly installment obligations.66
Res judicata traditionally may also be invoked through the "two-
dismissal" rule, which treats the second voluntary dismissal of a claim
as a loss on the merits. 67 Accordingly, if the debt is treated as indivisible
once accelerated, then the second voluntary dismissal can prevent
lenders from bringing a third claim based upon a subsequent breach of
the note, even if the original two claims were dismissed voluntarily and
were not disposed of on the merits. 68 In this instance, it would not
in Nonjudicial Foreclosure States, 31 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 341, 360 (2011)
(noting the financial restraints that often bar borrowers from obtaining proper legal
counsel in foreclosure litigation).
64 See Hamlin v. Peckler, No. 2005-SC-000166-MR, 2005 WL 3500784, at *1
(Ky. Dec. 22, 2005) ("The only difference between the 1999 claim and the 2004
claim was that MERS asserted a subsequent default on the note. Significantly,
however, the 1999 complaint and the 2004 complaint allege that the entire debt
became due on the same date, May 23, 1998. Hamlin pled res judicata and the trial
court initially sustained this plea in open court and dismissed the subsequent action.
Under authority of CR 60.02, however, the trial court, sua sponte, vacated its
dismissal order and reinstated the 2004 claim.").
65 United States v. Boozer, 732 F. Supp. 20, 22 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) ("By contrast,
defendant contends that the government's right of action accrued upon defendant's
initial default on each loan .... This court's review of the case law reveals that the
government's right of action accrues in a case such as this when the government first
makes a demand for payment in full.").
66 U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d 987, 992 (Ohio 2008) ("The
obligations to pay each installment merged into one obligation to pay the entire
balance on the note."); Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, Inc., 150 So. 2d 468, 472
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) ("The essential question is whether the election to
accelerate put the entire balance, including future installments at issue .... There
can be no doubt that the accelerated balance was at issue and that the prayer of the
complaint sought, not one interest installment, but the entire amount due.
Accordingly, it seems clear that the actions are identical.").
67 Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d at 991 ("Because the second dismissal here functioned
as an adjudication on the merits, res judicata would bar an action 'based upon any
claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject of the previous
action."' (quoting Grava v. Parkman Twp., 653 N.E.2d 226, 227 (Ohio 1995))).
68 Cadle Co. 11 v. Fountain, No. 49488, 2009 WL 1470032, at *1 (Nev. Feb. 26,
2009) ("Because an affirmative act is necessary to accelerate a mortgage, the same is
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matter that the relief sought in the original two claims were different or
based on subsequent actions.69
In addition, the lender only has a certain amount of time to bring a
claim for acceleration and foreclosure following a breach of the
mortgage.7 0 The statute of limitations in each state sets this amount of
time and can vary. 71 Typically, the statute of limitations for
foreclosures is tied to a breach of the underlying promissory note that
the mortgage secures.7 2 This is because the mortgage usually provides
for foreclosure rights in the event that the borrower breaches the
promissory note.73 For example, in New York, the statute of limitations
needed to decelerate. Accordingly, a deceleration, when appropriate, must be clearly
communicated by the lender/holder of the note to the obligor. Here, if CIT intended
to revoke the acceleration of the debt due under the note, it should have done so in a
writing documenting the changed status. The voluntary dismissal did not decelerate
the mortgage because it was not accompanied by a clear and unequivocal act
memorializing that deceleration."); Beneficial Ohio, Inc. v. Lemaster, No. 2008 CA
0100, 2009 WL 2457710, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. July 30, 2009) ("In the case sub
judice, all of the complaints arose from the same note, the same mortgage and the
same default. From the time of appellants' original default, the entire principal
became due as a result of the acceleration clause in the note. The terms of the note
and/or mortgage were never changed. As in the Gullotta case, from the time of
appellants' original breach, appellant's [sic] owed the entire amount of the principal
because of the acceleration clause.").
69 Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d at 993 ("Although U.S. Bank's complaint changed, the
operative facts remained the same. Plaintiffs cannot save their claims from the two-
dismissal rule simply by changing the relief sought in their complaint. Allowing
U.S. Bank to do so would be like allowing a plaintiff in a personal-injury case to
save his claim from the two-dismissal rule by amending his complaint to forgo a
couple of months of lost wages."); Parish, 2012 WL 966640, at *6 ("[W]e agree
with the Parishes' position that when a borrower defaults on a note and the holder
invokes an acceleration clause, the holder cannot file and dismiss an unlimited
number of lawsuits solely because the borrower makes payments after the holder
files each suit. In this scenario all claims would still arise from 'the same note, the
same mortgage, and the same default."' (quoting Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d at 991)).
70 10 ARTHUR L. CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 53.9 (Matthew
Bender 2017) ("No doubt there is much authority for the statement that where
separate actions would lie for a series of such breaches, the statute operates against
each one separately as of the time when each one could have been brought, and that
this rule is not affected by the fact that after two or more such breaches have
occurred the plaintiff must join them all in one action. Of course, if an action for a
first installment is barred by the statute, it cannot properly be included in an action
for later installments that are not yet barred.").
71 Id.
72 Id. ("The period fixed by a statute of limitations begins to run from the
'accrual of the cause of action."').
73 12 KARL B. HOLTZSCHUE, PURCHASE AND SALE OF REAL PROPERTY § 36.07
(Matthew Bender 2017) ("The most important feature of the mortgage relationship is
the power of the mortgagee to force the sale of the mortgaged land. The proceeds of
the sale are first used to cover any loss the mortgagee may have incurred because of
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to bring a foreclosure action following failure to pay on the underlying
promissory note is six years.74 This means that if the borrower fails to
make a payment on the note, then the lender only has six years from the
borrower's breach of the obligation to make that payment to bring a
foreclosure action, or it essentially waives the claim.
75
For statute of limitation purposes, treating the debt as indivisible
following acceleration means that the statute of limitations with respect
to all claims for payment under the promissory note begins to run once
the loan has been accelerated. 6 If the lender fails to pursue all claims
for payment under the promissory note before the statute of limitation
expires (as triggered by the loan acceleration), then the lender will be
barred from bringing future claims under the promissory note or from
foreclosure under the mortgage. 77 This is in fact the traditional rule.78
the debtor's default in meeting the terms of the mortgage obligation. 'Foreclosure'
became the process for transferring title to the mortgaged interest out of the
mortgagor-or the successor-to the purchaser at the mortgagee's foreclosure sale,
which may be, and in most cases is, the mortgagee itself.").
14 Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Mebane, 618 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994) (citing the applicable statute).
75 35 JEFFERSON JAMES DAVIS & CHARLES J. NAGY, FLORIDA JURISPRUDENCE
§ 73 (West 2d ed. 2013) ("This rule is consistent with the policy behind the statute of
limitations, which is to prevent unreasonable delay in the enforcement of legal rights
and to protect against the risk of injustice.").
76 In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc., 292 B.R. 476, 480 (N.D.N.Y 2003) ("[In
addressing a line of credit claim], causes of action seeking to recover the entire
contractual amount on installment contracts containing an optional acceleration
clause do not accrue until the option is exercised." (alteration in original)); Loiacono
v. Goldberg, 658 N.Y.S.2d 138, 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) ("The law is well settled
that with respect to a mortgage payable in installments, there are 'separate causes of
action for each installment accrued, and the Statute of Limitations [begins] to run, on
the date each installment [becomes] due' unless the mortgage debt is accelerated."
(alteration in original) (quoting Pagano v. Smith, 608 N.Y.S.2d 268, 270 (N.Y. App.
Div. (1994); then citing Khoury v. Alger, 571 N.Y.S.2d 829, 830 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991))); Mebane, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 90 ("Once the mortgage debt was accelerated, the
borrowers' right and obligation to make monthly installments ceased and all sums
became due and payable. Therefore, the six-year Statute of Limitations began to run
at that time. Consequently, this foreclosure action is time-barred." (citations
omitted)).
77 Hamlin v. Peckler, No. 2005-SC-000166-MR, 2005 WL 3500784, at *2 (Ky.
Dec. 22, 2005) ("No Kentucky case appears to squarely address whether there can be
subsequent defaults after suit is brought on an accelerated debt. However, the
answer would appear to be 'no' as one of the principal purposes of pleadings is to
develop the precise point in dispute by formulating the true issues. Thus, when the
mortgagee sought recovery of the entire unpaid indebtedness and sought to subject
the real property upon which the mortgage lien had been granted to payment of the
indebtedness, a default was asserted with respect to every installment of the debt,
foreclosing assertion of some subsequent claim of default.").
78 There does, however, appear to be a split in jurisdictions when the
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U.S. Bank National Ass 'n v. Gullotta, an Ohio Supreme Court case,
is an illustrative example of the traditional application of contract law
principles and res judicata with respect to acceleration clauses and
foreclosure.79 In 2003, Giuseppe Gullotta had taken out a mortgage
from MILA, Inc. to buy a home in Canton, Ohio." As in many
mortgages, Gullotta's contained an acceleration clause that could be
exercised upon default of a monthly installment payment.8 After
Gullotta missed several payments, U.S. Bank accelerated the loan in
April 2004 and demanded the entire amount due under the note, seeking
interest from November 1, 2003.82 Three months later, U.S. Bank
voluntarily dismissed this first case against Gullotta.83
In late 2004, U.S. Bank once again filed for foreclosure by
accelerating the debt and asked for interest from December 1, 2003, one
month apart from the allegation or demand in the first suit.84 U.S. Bank
dismissed this second case in 2005.85 U.S. Bank filed for foreclosure a
third time, in October 2005, seeking foreclosure of the entire loan
amount with interest from November 1, 2003, as in the first attempted
foreclosure case.86 Gullotta's motion to dismiss, treated as a motion for
summary judgment,87 argued that under the two-dismissal rule, U.S.
acceleration clause operates automatically, as opposed to by the voluntary election of
the mortgagee. 55 AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 428 (1973); see also Cook v.
Merrifield, 335 So. 2d 297, 299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a mortgage-
acceleration clause providing that "failure to pay any installments herein promptly
when due shall cause the entire indebtedness to become immediately due and
payable" is self-executing and acceleration was automatic upon default); Miles v.
Hamilton, 189 P. 926, 927-28 (Kan. 1920). But see Atkinson v. Kirby, 117 So. 2d
392, 395-96 (Ala. 1960); Fed. Land Bank of Omaha v. Wilmarth, 252 N.W. 507,
511-12 (Iowa 1934); Lawman v. Barnett, 177 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tenn. 1944)
(holding that the rule that a provision for acceleration of the maturity of a debt
secured by mortgage upon default of payment of an installment does no more than
confer an option upon the holder of the indebtedness is applicable where a statute
provides for an acceleration); Walker Bank & Tr. Co. v. Neilson, 490 P.2d 328, 328-
30 (Utah 1971).
'9 U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d 987 (Ohio 2008).
80 John Weber, Ohio Lenders Precludedfrom Bringing Third Complaint on
Same Note, REAL EST. ADVISOR L. BLOG (May 11, 2009),
http://www.realestateadvisorlawblog.com/2009/05/articles/ohio-lenders-precuded-
from-bringing-third-complaint-on-same-note/.
81 'Two Dismissal Rule'Applies to Mortgage Foreclosure Suit When Dismissed







87 U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Ohio 2008).
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Bank had already failed to prevail on the same claim twice and could
not bring another suit.88 U.S. Bank maintained each missed loan
payment was a separate actionable claim.89
U.S. Bank argued that its third claim was different from the first two
cases, insofar as: (i) U.S. Bank alleged and sought interest starting from
different default dates (November 2003 in the first foreclosure case,
December 2003 in the third foreclosure case, and April 2005 in its
Amended Complaint in the third foreclosure case); and (ii) each suit
contained and encapsulated new payments that had become due in the
time since the previous cases were filed.90 Gullotta, naturally, argued
that each suit contained a common nucleus of facts that would preclude
the third suit from being maintained.91
The trial court found for U.S. Bank, stating that when the first case
was voluntarily dismissed the note decelerated, and U.S. Bank's second
claim involved a different timeline (December 2003 in the second suit;
November 2003 in the first) not litigated in the first action and therefore
res judicata did not apply. 92 Accordingly, U.S. Bank's motion for
summary judgment was granted. 93 The Ohio Fifth District Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court, but did note conflict with previous case
law regarding res judicata in installment note claims. 94 The Ohio Fifth
District Court of Appeals stated that it disagreed with previous case law
and that "each new missed payment on an installment note is a new
claim." 95 Therefore, the Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals held the
two-dismissal rule and res judicata did not apply.96
In explaining the public policy grounds for its decision, the appellate
court argued that if Gullotta were to escape judgment, lenders would
88 See id.
89 See id.
9' See id. at 988-89.
91 Id. at 989 ("On February 10, 2006, the trial court converted Gullotta's motion
to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because the motion was 'founded on
matters outside the pleadings.' The trial court also granted U.S. Bank's motion for
leave to file an amended complaint. In its amended complaint, U.S. Bank brought
alternative claims. First, the bank sought judgment against Gullotta in the amount of
$164,390.91 plus interest at the rate of 7.35 percent per year from December 1, 2003.
In the alternative, the bank sought judgment against Gullotta in the amount of
$164,390.91 plus interest at the rate of 7.35 percent per year from April 1, 2005.
That April 1, 2005 date moved the start date for the collection of interest on the
overall debt to a time after U.S. Bank's second dismissal.").
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 990; see also EMC Mortg. Co. v. Jenkins, 841 N.E.2d 855, 862-63
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
95 U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Gullotta, No. 2006CA00145, 2007 WL 1248407, at
*5 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2007), rev 'd, 899 N.E.2d 987 (Ohio 2008).
96 Id.
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have less incentive to try and settle foreclosure suits with borrowers, as
dismissal of the action upon settlement would require a full examination
of whether the foreclosing entity waives all future foreclosure rights.
9 7
Gullotta subsequently filed a motion to certify the conflict between the
Ohio District Courts of Appeals.98
The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court rulings and
instead determined that U.S. Bank had in fact made the same claim each
time it accelerated the debt and brought a case. 99 The court held that
the entire note was due upon the breach due to acceleration, not just the
installment payments missed. 1 00 In other words, once acceleration of a
debt occurs, the entire debt then becomes indivisible and all of the
individual installments merged into one balance.101 All of U.S. Bank's
claims were the same, and trying to skirt around res judicata by adding
interest charges would not change the "common nucleus of operative
facts. ' 10 2 The court analogized this situation to a personal injury case:
if U.S. Bank could avoid res judicata or the two-dismissal rule merely
by amending its damages demand by a few months, then a personal
injury plaintiff presumably could avoid res judicata simply by reducing
his or her demand for future lost wages by a couple of months, a
seemingly nonsensical result.103 The court clarified, though, that should
a renegotiation of the loan and its terms occur, causing a material change
after a default and foreclosure action, then the next claim would not be
the same. 10 4
Subsequent Ohio courts have struggled to deal with Gullotta's open-
ended statement about whether a mortgage loan had materially
changed. 105 Lower courts have found ways to avoid the extreme
application implications of Gullotta and the double dismissal defense,
particularly when a subsequent payment is made by the debtor or if
acceleration is not automatic.106 Similar to the reasoning discussed in
9' See id.
98 Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d at 990.
99 See id. at 990, 993-94.
100 Id. at 992.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 993.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See, e.g., Beneficial Ohio, Inc. v. Parish, No. 11CA3210, 2012 WL 966640,
at *6-7, *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2012) (finding that, in a third foreclosure action,
the trial judge erred in awarding summary judgment to the holder because genuine
issues of material fact existed as to whether the complaints arose from the same
transaction or occurrence, and as to whether res judicata applied based on the double
dismissal rule).
106 See, e.g., Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB, No. 1:07 CV 2739, 2013 WL
4784292, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 6, 2013) ("The facts of Gullotta could not be more
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Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, Inc., subsequent payments on the
mortgage or materially altering the mortgage contract may result in a
new claim. 10 7
It should be noted, however, that courts wrestling with these
questions often expressly state that making an additional payment alone
is not enough to prevent res judicata.108 In Bank ofAmerica v. Gaizutis,
for example, the Ohio Eleventh District Court of Appeals held that
Gaizutis's subsequent payment on the debt reworked the contract and
decelerated the loan at that point. 109 The only material difference
between Gaizutis and Gullotta was that in the former, the debtor made
a payment on the debt which included a letter stating it would bring the
loan up to date and the initial suit could be dismissed, which according
dissimilar than the facts presently before the Court. In this case, after the initial
default, the Lisa Bridge cured and Deutsche Bank did not accelerate the loan.
Further, Lisa Bridge made numerous additional payments after the initial default,
and at times, was current on her payments. Moreover, in this lawsuit, Deutsche
Bank does not demand the same principal payment as it would have demanded in
foreclosure based upon the cured 2002 default.").
107 See id; Stadler v. Cherry Developers, Inc., 150 So. 2d 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963); see also Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Smith, No. C-140514, 2015
WL 4508449, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. July 24, 2015) ("The court would have also been
right to deny amendment on the basis that it would be a futile act. In support of her
argument that res judicata applies, Ms. Smith relies upon [Gullotta], a case in which
the two-dismissal rule was applied to dismiss a foreclosure action. But in Gullotta,
the court explained that 'Civ. R. 41(A) would not apply to bar a third claim if the
third claim were different from the dismissed claims.' In fact, '[h]ad there been any
change as to the terms of the note or mortgage, had any payments been credited, or
had the loan been reinstated res judicata would not be in play.' Here, Ms. Smith
admits that she paid Deutsche Bank $4,755.56 to cure any default in 2007. Because
a payment had been credited, the present claim is different than the previously
dismissed claims, and the two-dismissal rule would not apply." (alteration in
original) (quoting Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d at 993)).
108 See Parish, 2012 WL 966640, at *6 ("[T]he holder cannot file and dismiss an
unlimited number of lawsuits solely because the borrower makes payments after the
holder files each suit. In this scenario all claims would still arise from 'the same
note, the same mortgage, and the same default."' (quoting Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d at
991)).
109 See Bank of America, N.A. v. Gaizutis, No. 2014-G-3176, 2014 WL
4825371, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2014) ("Instead of filing the agreed
judgment entry of dismissal signed by appellant's attorney, appellee's then-attorney
filed a unilateral dismissal, pursuant to Civ. R. 41 (A)(1). However, if there was a
claim that a material term of the letter agreement had been breached, no such claim
appears in this record. The one thing that is clear from the correspondence is that the
parties agreed to have the suit dismissed upon payment of a significant lump sum
that would be applied to the amount due on the loan. While the documentation
suggests a clear intention to 'reinstate' the loan, based on the discussion from the
Supreme Court in Gullotta, supra, whether it was actually reinstated or not matters
little.").
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to the Gaizutis court materially changed the contract."' As a result, the
Gaizutis court affirmed the lower court's ruling for the bank."'
Although the Ohio Fifth Circuit District Court of Appeals suggested
that harsh rules on dismissal might dissuade lenders from renegotiating
with borrowers, the traditional Gullotta approach to res judicata and the
two-dismissal rule described above arguably would provide more
encouragement to lenders to negotiate with borrowers.1 1 2 Banks and
servicers would have to seriously consider settling with borrowers
before accelerating and suing on the loan, because any action on that
acceleration may only be permitted once. 3 Similarly, the higher stakes
for bearing a dismissal on the merits might mean that lenders will act
11o See id.
1 Id. ("The amount of the payment and documentation contained in the record
reflects the parties' desire to have the foreclosure dismissed and the appellants back
to a position where they could remain in their home. Further, the mortgage at issue
contemplates the right of a borrower to reinstate the mortgage after acceleration
contingent upon the borrower meeting certain conditions outlined in the mortgage.
The mortgage further states that upon reinstatement by the borrower, 'this Security
Instrument and obligations secured hereby shall remain fully effective as if no
acceleration had occurred."').
112 See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Gullotta, No. 2006CA00145, 2007 WL
1248407, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2007) ("In addition, the application of Rule
41 (A) per the EMC case would discourage a lender, such as appellant, from working
with a borrower, such as appellee, when the borrower defaults on a mortgage.
Frequently, after filing a foreclosure action, a lender will work with the buyer so that
the buyer can retain his or her property. The lender will then dismiss the foreclosure
action. A lender would not be inclined to do so if a dismissal precluded a bank from
eventually foreclosing on a borrower's property after a default. As a result, the
number of foreclosures would increase as would the number of individuals losing
their homes."), rev 'd, 899 N.E.2d 987 (Ohio 2008).
113 See Parish, 2012 WL 966640, at *6 ("Nonetheless, we agree with the
Parishes' position that when a borrower defaults on a note and the holder invokes an
acceleration clause, the holder cannot file and dismiss an unlimited number of
lawsuits solely because the borrower makes payments after the holder files each suit.
In this scenario all claims would still arise from 'the same note, the same mortgage,
and the same default."' (quoting Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d at 991)); see also Deutsche
Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Beauvais, 188 So. 3d 938, 969 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)
(Scales, J., dissenting) ("The expiration of a statute of limitations, however,
generally results in a windfall for the escaping defendant. In my view, neither the
moral imperative that borrowers pay their obligations, nor Singleton, has abrogated
decades of Florida jurisprudence governing the statute of limitations in foreclosure
cases."); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d 987, 993 (Ohio 2008)
("Although U.S. Bank's complaint changed, the operative facts remained the same.
Plaintiffs cannot save their claims from the two-dismissal rule simply by changing
the relief sought in their complaint. Allowing U.S. Bank to do so would be like
allowing a plaintiff in a personal-injury case to save his claim from the two-
dismissal rule by amending his complaint to forgo a couple of months of lost
wages.").
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more conservatively in undertaking oft-criticized servicing activities.1
14
For example, some lenders have been accused of inducing missed
payment defaults by fraudulently charging force-placed insurance
policies and demanding large sums for escrow, or by telling
homeowners that loss mitigation assistance will not be made available
until they fall behind on their payments. 115
In a jurisdiction where a dismissal on a fact dispute about default
might preclude a future foreclosure action, perhaps lenders would be
less likely to bring marginal cases to court. In this way, the risk of a
dismissal on future actions may spur banks and servicers to be
additionally diligent about following servicing guidelines before
electing for the severe remedy of acceleration and foreclosure.
Justice Cardozo long ago recognized the blatant oppression that can
occur to the mortgagor when the mortgagee is allowed to unsheathe its
acceleration sword without considering external factors.116 In light of
the many irregularities and abuses of lenders with respect to foreclosure
practices we have noted elsewhere, it seems that such external factors
remain relevant.'1 17 Thus, while our research seems to suggest that some
courts are creating exceptions to harsh rules like res judicata and the
double dismissal rule, these exceptions only seem to engage with one
side of Gullotta's implications, specifically that banks might face harsh
results.118 Such allowances, however, do not address potentially harsh
results for other parties, namely that failure to strictly enforce
longstanding principles like res judicata will encourage lenders to bring
cases with flimsy or fraudulent evidence, to induce defaults with no
ultimate consequences, and to otherwise repeatedly impair a
114 See Parish, 2012 WL 966640, at *6.
115 See id; see also Beauvais, 188 So. 3d at 960 n.19.
116 Gilligan, supra note 35, at 94 n.3 (citing and quoting Grafv. Hope Bldg.
Corp., 171 N. E. 884, 889 (1930) (Cardozo, J., dissenting)) ("There, through an error
in a bookkeeper's arithmetic, payment of what should have been an installment of
$6,121.56 was $401.87 short of the correct amount. Enforcement of the acceleration
provision (as sustained by the majority) meant that because of the $401.87
deficiency, the mortgagor's interest was foreclosed in a property mortgaged for
$335,000. 'In this case, the hardship is so flagrant.., the oppression so apparent, as
to justify a holding that only through an acceptance of the tender will equity be done.
... The deficiency, though not so small as to be negligible within the doctrine of de
minimis, was still slight and unimportant when compared with the payment duly
made."').
117 A Standing Question, supra note 17, at 706 ("In the rush to originate and
assign as many mortgages as possible, and in the face of an overwhelming volume of
foreclosures to be processed, mortgagees and their assignees often failed to assign
the mortgages properly and, in some instances, committed fraud or other
unauthorized acts in order to correct the assignment paper trail.").
118 See supra notes 106-07 and the accompanying text.
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homeowner's peace and wellbeing, regardless of the merits of the
claims the lender repeatedly brings.' 19
It also bears mentioning that these exceptions that do not adapt the
Gullotta reasoning ignore the fact that dismissals, whether voluntary or
involuntary, are exceedingly avoidable in foreclosure litigation.1 20 In
many judicial foreclosure jurisdictions, the burden of proof is low, court
procedures have been enacted specifically for the benefit of banks and
their attorneys, 121 and very few documents are needed to prove
entitlement to foreclose.1 22 In light of such incredibly low litigation
burdens, the fact that a bank even faces a two-dismissal rule bar, in the
absence of renegotiation or other intervening circumstances, is an
astonishing de facto admission of either basic incompetence by lender
attorneys or the complete lack of pertinent evidence supporting
foreclosure. It is unclear why courts feel obligated to reward such
conduct in allowing repetitive successive actions. 123 While some
scholars, and indeed judges, fear giving "free" houses to mortgagors,1 24
logic does not dictate that procedural predictability, longstanding
precedent, and incentivizing good litigation practices should be totally
abandoned. 125 Gullotta and similar cases recognize that while
119 See Parish, 2012 WL 966640, at *6.
120 Cf Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Drayer, No. CV-2015-105086, 2016 Ohio
Misc. LEXIS 10334, at *2 (Ohio C.P. Summit Cty. Oct. 19, 2016) ("Lenders like the
Plaintiff would be more willing to discuss alternatives that require the dismissal of
foreclosure if they had assurances that their dismissals would not threaten the long-
term contractual relationship between the parties. Therefore, it is in the best interests
of the parties to dismiss this action without prejudice.").
121 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 17-19.
122 Id. at 27-28.
123 See infra Section III.A.
124 See, e.g., Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1007-08 (Fla.
2004) ("If res judicata prevented a mortgagee from acting on a subsequent default
even after an earlier claimed default could not be established, the mortgagor would
have no incentive to make future timely payments on the note. The adjudication of
the earlier default would essentially insulate her from future foreclosure actions on
the note-merely because she prevailed in the first action. Clearly, justice would not
be served if the mortgagee was barred from challenging the subsequent default
payment solely because he failed to prove the earlier alleged default.").
125 Even the mere fact that judges sometimes reference "free" houses is evidence
of the previewing bias effect that we have covered in previous research and herein.
See infra Part IV. Only reflexive, unthinking preconceptions could lead a fact-finder
to enter a proceeding believing that a pro-homeowner ruling means a house is
actually obtained for free, when many homeowners faced foreclosure after years of
regular payments, when many put their life savings into the purchase of the home,
when any homeowner asserting defenses undoubtedly will have to expend sums on
attorneys, and when any such pro-homeowner ruling-even if ultimately
successful-will likely result in appeal and more legal costs to the homeowner. See
infra Section III.C. In the case ofres judicata and the two-dismissal rule in
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exceptions should exist for real world application of a harsh remedy like
res judicata or the statute of limitations, the opposite can also mean the
harsh result of innumerable successive actions, regardless of the merits
of the claims repeatedly litigated.
B. Multiple and Nearly Unlimited Bites at the Apple
Over time, some courts have narrowed the application of res
judicata and the statute of limitations to permit lenders to bring multiple
foreclosure claims after accelerations of the promissory note.1 26 For
example, erosion of the traditional rules in Florida began with courts
rejecting holdings that suggest acceleration of an installment obligation
creates a single indivisible obligation, at least with respect to home
mortgages.1 27 In this view, a lender's earlier acceleration of a loan can
be ignored because the lender's subsequent voluntary dismissal of the
earlier claim means that the lender actually elected not to accelerate and
demand the full amount due under the note.1 28 Accordingly, resjudicata
may not bar future claims if they are based on different dates of
default. 129
particular, homeowners will have had to pay an attorney to defend more than one
lawsuit. See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d 987, 990-91 (Ohio
2008) (explaining that the two-dismissal rule requires repetitive litigation); see also
Wagner, Jr., supra note 60, § 2(a) (explaining that res judicata rests on the existence
of repetitive litigation).
126 See, e.g., Olympia Mortg. Corp. v. Pugh, 774 So. 2d 863, 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000).
127 See id. (finding that the decision to accelerate did not affect the lender's
ability to bring claims for subsequent defaults); see also Singleton, 882 So. 2d at
1006 ("While it is true that a foreclosure action and an acceleration of the balance
due based upon the same default may bar a subsequent action on that default, an
acceleration and foreclosure predicated upon subsequent and different defaults
present a separate and distinct issue.").
128 See Pugh, 774 So. 2d at 866 ("By voluntarily dismissing the suit, [the lender]
in effect decided not to accelerate payment on the note and mortgage at that time."
(alteration in original)); see also Mitchell v. Fed. Land Bank, 174 S.W.2d 671, 677
(Ark. 1943) ("[T]he declaration of plaintiff s election by bringing the first action did
not put it out of his power to waive the penalty, which he did by accepting the
interest and dismissing the action." (quoting Cal. Say. & Loan Soc'y v. Culver, 59 P.
292, 294 (Cal. 1899))).
129 See, e.g., Bartram v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 211 So. 3d 1009, 1012, 1023
(Fla. 2016) ("[W]hen a second and separate action for foreclosure is sought for a
default that involves a separate period of default from the one alleged in the first
action, the case is not necessarily barred by res judicata.... [A]n acceleration and
foreclosure based upon subsequent and different defaults present a separate and
distinct issue." (quoting Singleton, 882 So. 2d at 1006-07)), reh 'g denied, 2017 Fla.
LEXIS 593 (Fla. Mar. 17, 2017); see also Afolabi v. Atl. Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 849
N.E.2d 1170, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) ("[W]e conclude that... res judicata does
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This evolving exception to longstanding doctrine is said to "[rest]
upon a recognition of the unique nature of the mortgage obligation and
the continuing obligations of the parties in that relationship." 30 If res
judicata precluded a lender from bringing future lawsuits based upon
future defaults, courts fear there would be no penalty for borrowers
failing to pay amounts when due under the contract, which would lead
to inequitable results. 31 A "subsequent and separate alleged default"
not bar successive foreclosure claims, regardless of whether or not the mortgagee
sought to accelerate payments on the note in the first claim."). As discussed infra
Part II, courts disagree on how and whether lenders can revoke acceleration. John A.
Walker, Jr., Simple Real Estate Foreclosures Made Complex: The Byzantine
Tennessee Process, 62 TENN. L. REv. 231, 242 (1995) ("Even if the deed of trust
contains an acceleration clause, the mortgagor may be able to defeat it by properly
tendering an overdue payment before the mortgagee actually accelerates the
indebtedness. However, tendering the overdue amount after acceleration has
occurred, even if done before the sale, will not revoke acceleration unless so agreed
by the parties. The Tennessee Supreme Court succinctly posited the above rules in
Lee v. Security Bank & Trust Co." (citations omitted)); see also 1 BRUCE J.
BERGMAN, BERGMAN ON NEW YORK MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES § 5.02 (Matthew
Bender 2017) ("Thus, the mere acceptance of a post-acceleration partial payment
does not represent an affirmative act revoking acceleration."). But see In re Taddeo,
685 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1982) ("First, we think that the power to cure must
comprehend the power to 'de-accelerate.' This follows from the concept of 'curing a
default.' A default is an event in the debtor-creditor relationship which triggers
certain consequences -- here, acceleration. Curing a default commonly means taking
care of the triggering event and returning to pre-default conditions. The
consequences are thus nullified."); Callan v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 93 F.
Supp. 3d 725, 734 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (discussing whether Texas law permits
unilateral notices of rescission of acceleration, thereby restarting the statute of
limitations); Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Mebane, 618 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1994) ("It cannot be said that a dismissal by the court constituted an affirmative
act by the lender to revoke its election to accelerate."). The right to rescind
acceleration may also be limited. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Citizens Bank of
Portland, 583 N.E.2d 184, 190 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) ("An election to accelerate a
debt may become irrevocable if the election causes the defaulting party to rely and
act upon the acceleration to its detriment."). The mortgage itself also may address
the issue and permit reinstatement of the installment nature of the contract.
Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Beauvais, 188 So. 3d 938, 962 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2016) (en banc) (citing the reinstatement provisions of the mortgage as continuing
the installment nature of the contractual obligations even after acceleration and filing
of a foreclosure claim).
130 Singleton, 882 So. 2d at 1007 (alteration in original). But see FDIC v.
Massingill, 24 F.3d 768, 777-78 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing how various states
determine whether acceleration has been properly rescinded); Johnson vs. Samson
Constr. Corp., 704 A.2d 866, 869 (Me. 1997); Snyder v. Exum, 315 S.E.2d 216, 218
(Va. 1984) ("[W]e see no valid distinction between an acceleration clause in a lease
and one contained in a note.").
131 Singleton, 882 So. 2d at 1008 ("Clearly, justice would not be served if the
mortgage was barred from challenging the subsequent default solely because he
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thus can provide "a new and independent right in the mortgagee to
accelerate payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action.1 32
The two-dismissal rule can be defeated under this approach as well,
since each claim made with respect to different default dates will be
treated as separate and distinct, even if acceleration previously
occurred. 133 Accordingly, lenders will not be prevented from
repeatedly filing and dismissing claims as long as the claims involve
subsequent defaults that are separate and distinct. 13 4 As Part IV will
discuss, this analysis is not compelled by traditional two-dismissal rule
analysis and, in fact, would render the two-dismissal rule "meaningless
in the context of foreclosure actions because every successive attempt
to foreclose a mortgage could be construed as a new claim." '135
This exception to res judicata and the two-dismissal rule also
potentially applies to statute of limitations analysis. If each default
starts its own individual statute of limitations, then the expiration of the
statute of limitations with respect to an earlier claim will have no
bearing on whether the lender can bring other claims, even if the loan
had been accelerated when the first claim was filed.136 This would
failed to prove the earlier alleged default."). There is also a fear that borrowers
could enter into settlement with the lender that, coupled with a dismissal with
prejudice, would "insulate the mortgagor from the consequences of a subsequent
default." Fairbank's Capital Corp. v. Milligan, 234 Fed. App'x 21, 24 (3d Cir.
2007). Again, these points of view completely ignore the light burden that
foreclosing entities bear and the immediate questions and doubts that should arise
when any foreclosing entity is forced to continually retry its cases. See supra notes
120-25 and accompanying text.
132 Singleton, 882 So. 2d at 1008.
133 See, e.g., Pugh, 774 So. 2d at 863 (finding that the decision to accelerate did
not affect the lender's ability to bring claims based on different dates of default).
134 See id.
135 U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d 987, 992 (Ohio 2008). The
Ohio Supreme Court noted that nothing in the two-dismissal rule (as in effect in
Ohio) "indicates that it should not apply to foreclosure actions." Id; see also
Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Beauvais, 188 So. 3d 938, 963 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2016) (Scales, J., dissenting) ("Explicit in Singleton is that, in order to reinstate the
parties' previous contractual relationship so that subsequent defaults may occur, the
trial court's adjudication of the first foreclosure action must deny the lender's
acceleration. Otherwise... the lender's affirmative, contractually prescribed
acceleration remains unaffected.").
136 10 CORBIN ET AL., supra note 70, § 53.9 ("[U]nder an installment contract the
statute of limitations runs only against each installment at the time it becomes due.
'In essence,' the court explained, 'this rule treats each missed or otherwise deficient
payment as an independent breach of contract subject to its own limitations period."'
(quoting Pierce v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 307 F. Supp. 2d 325, 328-29 (D.N.H.
2004)). But see Beauvais, 188 So. 3d at 965 (Scales, J., dissenting) ("[The majority
holds] that payment default and not acceleration constitute the last element of a
foreclosure cause of action .... [T]his holding marks an upheaval of well-
continued...
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apply even where the first claim, after acceleration of the loan and
demand for the entire amount due on the note, had been lost on the
merits. 137
Recent cases in Florida illustrate how the traditional approach has
been transformed in the foreclosure context so as to essentially
eviscerate the protection of the statute of limitations and res judicata. 138
In Singleton v. Greymar Associates, the Florida Supreme Court
confronted an appellate circuit split regarding acceleration and
foreclosure after a first foreclosure case was dismissed.139 On one side,
the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal held in Singleton that the
earlier dismissal did not bar the present suit under res judicata. 140 The
Florida Second District Court of Appeal, by contrast, held in Stadler v.
Cherry Hill Developers, Inc. that a mortgagee who had their first
lawsuit dismissed with prejudice was barred from filing a future suit by
res judicata. 141
In Singleton, Gwendolyn Singleton had a mortgage on her home that
established Florida law." (alteration in original)).
137 See Collazo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 213 So. 3d 1012, 1013 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2016) ("This Court's decision issued on rehearing en banc in the case of
[Beauvais], holds that the five-year statute does not bar a second foreclosure suit
filed on a subsequent payment default occurring within the five-year statutory period
preceding the commencement of the second suit .... The record in the present case
discloses that HSBC asserted the same payment default date and basis for
acceleration in both the 2008 and 2014 complaints, a date over five years preceding
the commencement of the 2014 case in the circuit court. As a result, we reverse the
final judgment of foreclosure and remand the case for dismissal without prejudice in
accordance with this Court's recent opinion on rehearing en banc in Beauvais."
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)); see also Beauvais, 188 So. 3d at 938
(finding that each default has a separate statute of limitation, even if the loan had
been previously accelerated and regardless of whether the claim was dismissed with
or without prejudice); U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc. v. Bartram, 140 So. 3d 1007, 1014
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) ("Therefore, we conclude that a foreclosure action for
default in payments occurring after the order of dismissal in the first foreclosure
action is not barred by the statute of limitations found in section 95.11 (2)(c), Florida
Statutes, provided the subsequent foreclosure action on the subsequent defaults is
brought within the limitations period."), aff'd, 211 So. 3d 1009 (Fla. 2016), reh 'g
denied, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 593 (Fla. Mar. 17, 2017).138 See Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2004).
139 See id.
140 See id. at 1005 ("On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed the circuit court's
decision, finding that 'even though an earlier foreclosure action filed by appellee was
dismissed with prejudice, the application of res judicata does not bar this lawsuit....
The second action involved a new and different breach."' (alteration in original)
(quoting Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 840 So. 2d 356, 356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003), aff'd, 882 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2004))).
141 See Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, Inc., 150 So. 2d 468, 473 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1963).
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contained an acceleration clause. 142 Greymar Associates brought an
action alleging default that extended from nonpayment from September
1, 1999, to February 1, 2000.143 After Greymar failed to appear at a
case management conference, the circuit court dismissed the case with
prejudice. 144 Greymar brought a second action and alleged different
default dates, claiming damages from April 1, 2000, onward. 145 The
trial court rejected the mortgagor's res judicata defense. 146 The Florida
Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision
because the second lawsuit alleged what the court termed a new and
separate breach. 147 Singleton then petitioned the Florida Supreme Court
to deal with the "express and direct conflict between the Fourth
District's decision and the Second Circuit's decision" in Stadler.148
In Stadler, the foreclosing Plaintiff, Cherry Hill Developers
("Cherry Hill"), missed a deadline to preserve testimony or set a trial
under a later-expired Florida rule of procedure. 149 As a result, the trial
court granted Stadler's motion for a final judgment. 150 The second
lawsuit filed by Cherry Hill was "essentially identical" to the claims
made in the first lawsuit, except for allegations of a different default
date.151 The default alleged against Stadler in the first case was May
1960, but the default date alleged in the second suit was August 1960.152
In the Florida Second District Court of Appeal, Cherry Hill argued that
the dismissal of the first claim was not clearly on the merits and not
related to default or acceleration, and that res judicata should therefore
not apply.153 While recognizing longstanding exceptions to the harsh
application of res judicata, such as unjust enrichment or possible
misunderstanding of the finality and effect of the first order or
judgment, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal reasoned:
The essential question is whether the election to
accelerate put the entire balance, including future
installments at issue. If it was at issue then the second
action seeks the same relief under the same contract and
142 Singleton, at 1009.











153 Id. at 470-72.
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is predicated on a failure to comply with the same
requirement. There can be no doubt that the accelerated
balance was at issue and that the prayer of the complaint
sought, not one interest installment, but the entire
amount due. Accordingly, it seems clear that the actions
are identical.15 4
The Stadler court noted that this holding, as researched in its 1960
decision, was based on near unanimity among authorities determining
the effect of acceleration. 155 That is, electing to accelerate a loan
necessarily entails demanding the entire amount of the loan, which
"puts all future installment payments in issue and forecloses successive
suits. 1 56 Accordingly, the court upheld the dismissal of the second suit
on resjudicata grounds because the two foreclosure suits against Stadler
were identical.1 57
Significantly, the Florida Supreme Court in Singleton did not
describe how the Second District's definition of acceleration and its
legal effect was wrong or unfounded, or describe any development in
jurisprudence or change in mortgage term definitions that would
suggest acceleration does not mean that the entire agreement is
integrated into one claim or demand or that future installments are
necessarily part of any accelerated claim.1 58 Instead, the court merely
noted discontent with Stadler's "stricter and more technical" view of
acceleration. 159 The support cited in favor of this novel view of
acceleration, provided by the Florida Supreme Court, was a single
citation to a Florida appellate opinion, which the Florida Supreme Court
quoted as authority to suggest that acceleration does not place any future
installments at issue. 160
In this sole case cited for this brand-new conception of acceleration,
Olympia Mortgage Corp. v. Pugh, the foreclosing entity, Olympia
Mortgage Corporation ("Olympia Mortgage"), had filed three
successive foreclosure actions. The first alleged a default date of
April 1995 and was voluntarily dismissed. 162 The appellate court noted
that at the time of the first suit, Olympia Mortgage had not been
154 Id. at 472.
155 See id. at 472-73.
156 Id. at 472.
157 See id. at 473.
158 See Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Fla. 2004).
159 Id. at 1006.
160 See id. at 1006 (citing Olympia Mortg. Corp. v. Pugh, 774 So. 2d 864, 866
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
161 See Pugh, 774 So. 2d at 864.
162 See id. at 865.
continued...
416 WAKE FOREST J. [VOL. 18
BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L.
assigned the mortgage loan it sought to enforce. 163 The second suit
alleged a default date of May 1995 and was also voluntarily dismissed,
as Olympia Mortgage again failed to complete basic pre-suit
requirements necessary to maintain its claim. 164 The third case alleged
the same May 1995 default date as alleged in the second suit; and, even
without the difference in the April and May 1995 default dates as
described in the case history, the parties apparently stipulated that "the
parties agreed that both [the first and second foreclosure] actions alleged
April 1, 1995 as the initial date of default.- 165
Confronting this set of confusing facts brought on by lack of proof
and by incompetent litigation in the first two suits, the Pugh court
hunted for a coherent reason to determine why the traditional definition
of acceleration, in light of the authority that acceleration places future
installments at issue, should not be respected. 166 In a remarkable bit of
trying to fit a square peg into a round hole, the Florida Fourth District
Court of Appeal produced something akin to a verbal representation of
an Escher painting:
[I]f we treat Olympia's voluntary dismissal of the first
foreclosure action as an adjudication on the merits
against Olympia, then the payment on the note and
mortgage could not have been accelerated. Although
Olympia sought to accelerate, had Olympia gone
through with the suit and lost on the merits, then the
court would have necessarily found that the Pughs had
not defaulted on the payments due to date. If the Pughs
had not defaulted, then Olympia would not be entitled to
accelerate payment on the note and mortgage. By
voluntarily dismissing the suit, Olympia in effect
decided not to accelerate payment on the note and
mortgage at that time. 167
The Pugh court thus opened the door to two concepts previously
unknown in acceleration. First, it implicates that in every dismissal for
whatever cause, any alleged default is necessarily disproven, rendering
acceleration a factual impossibility. 168 This is apparently so by virtue
of the Fourth District's judicial fiat, regardless of whether the actual
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 Id. at 865 n.1 (alteration in original).
166 Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, Inc., 150 So. 2d 468, 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963).
167 Pugh, 774 So. 2d at 866.
168 See id.
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default date was a contested issue in the case.16 9 It is entirely unclear
how a dismissal on the merits of a case seen through to a verdict, in the
Pugh reasoning's example above, would necessarily mean that default
was disproven. Nothing inherent in a dismissal, whether voluntary or
involuntary, means a default was disproven, because defeat of a
foreclosing entity's claims can be defeated on innumerable grounds not
involving a default question that would be deemed "on the merits. 170
The second fiction in the Pugh court's decision is that acceleration
is only a fact if ratified by a court. In other words, the Pugh court
declared that acceleration, the demand for all payments due under a
note, only occurs if a court reaches a final judgment in favor of a bank
or foreclosing entity.171 This, of course, is contradicted by longstanding
jurisprudence on acceleration and resjudicata, as noted above. 172 In its
supposition that "voluntary dismissal of a suit" always means that a
foreclosing entity "in effect decided not to accelerate payment on the
note and mortgage at that time," 173 the Florida Supreme Court
constructed the only possible legal reading that would give banks
continual opportunities to file suit, regardless of the actual reason for
dismissal. 174 It is extremely rare for a voluntary dismissal to contain
language that indicates mortgagors are thereafter not being demanded
to pay the full amount of their loans, as would be implied by this
artificial, automatic deceleration rule. 175 Judicial dismissal under this
theoretical approach actually performs a significant service to
foreclosing banks' claims, as courts consequently deem the note
decelerated and the bank can continue to bring defective claims ad
infinitum.176
169 See id. (emphasis added).
170 Id. These would include conditions precedent, standing, fraud, etc. For
example, a party may fail to comply with an order of court to produce discovery and
have their case dismissed. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b) ("Any party may move for
dismissal of an action or of any claim against that party for failure of an adverse
party to comply with.., any order of court."). Although such decision would be
"on the merits" of the case, the Pugh court would apparently reason that a dismissal
based upon failure to respond to discovery would also mean that default was
disproven, even if it had never been at issue in the case and had never been litigated.
See Pugh, 774 So. 2d. at 866.
" See Pugh, 774 So. 2d at 867.
172 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
173 Pugh, 774 So. 2d at 866.
174 See id. at 867.
175 See id. at 866 ("[W]hether the mortgagor will make future installment
payments is not at issue in a foreclosure action.").
176 Among other questionable propositions in the Pugh decision is the assertion
that "whether the mortgagor will make future installment payments is not the issue
in a foreclosure action. The issue is whether there has already been a default."
Pugh, 774 So. 2d at 866. If payment of future installments is not at issue in
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The Pugh court's liberalized judicial approach, then, laid the
groundwork for the Florida Supreme Court in Singleton to overrule
longstanding rules of acceleration and to declare that acceleration, in
foreclosure or installment payment cases only, should not be given strict
or technical enforcement as in Stadler.177 Unsurprisingly, the Singleton
court, citing other cases that held that a second and separate action on a
different alleged default date does not necessarily bar successive suits,
ruled against the application of res judicata and ruled in favor of the
foreclosing entity. 178 In effect, the Singleton court eliminated the effect
of res judicata in foreclosures in one decision: "acceleration and
foreclosure predicated upon subsequent and different defaults present a
separate and distinct issue." 179 Singleton thus implicitly opened the
floodgates to the kind of slight, de minimis, variation in pleadings and
claims the Gullotta court worried about. 8 That is, the Singleton court
decision authorizes foreclosing entities to file suit to claim 29 years or
348 months of payments, and then change their allegations to demand,
for example, 347 months of payments, to create a "separate and distinct
claim" necessary to avoid res judicata 1 1
The Singleton court attempted to minimize the implications of its
ruling. Specifically, the court stated:
We conclude that the doctrine of res judicata does not
necessarily bar successive foreclosure suits, regardless
of whether or not the mortgagee sought to accelerate
payments on the note in the first suit. In this case the
subsequent and separate alleged default created a new
and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate
payment on the note in a subsequent foreclosure action.
Thus, we approve the Fourth District's decision in
foreclosure actions, then why do foreclosure judgments grant entitlement to the
entire amount of the loan not due for 30 years? See, e.g., Beneficial Ohio, Inc. v.
Lemaster, No. 2008 CA 0100, 2009 WL 2457710, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. July 30,
2009). Indeed, the entire point of acceleration is to place future payments at front
and center of any case-as banks should not have to file a separate action for every
month a payment is missed. See Hahn, supra note 34. And, in actual fact, this
results in the scenario presented by Beauvais: later courts have piggybacked on this
absurd notion and opined that a dismissal not only means automatic deceleration, but
also that the homeowners are placed back into a situation where they can resume
their normal payments. See infra Part IV. This is highly dubious.
177 See Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1006-08 (Fla. 2004).
178 Id. at 1007.
179 Id.
180 See id. at 1006; U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Gullotta, 899 N.E.2d 987, 992-93
(Ohio 2008).
181 Singleton, 882 So. 2d at 1006-07.
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Singleton, and disapprove of the Second District's
holding in Stadler. 182
Again, given that the Singleton court ruled on a case where the
difference in default date allegations was one month, it would seem that
its assertion that res judicata "may, but does not necessarily" apply is
misleading. 183 The court phrased the ruling as an exception to res
judicata, but the practical effect of this ruling means that the exception
is now the rule. In other words, any competent attorney in a successive
foreclosure suit now will allege a separate default date and thereby
successfully avoid res judicata (even if the subsequent suit is the tenth
successive attempted claim relating to the same loan). Although the
court did pay lip service to the "tension" between the harsh remedy of
res judicata and the equities of a given foreclosure case, it is patently
clear the court felt the "ends of justice" lay with banks and lenders, not
homeowners. 184
Along the same lines, the Florida Supreme Court eradicated the
effect of the statute of limitations in foreclosure actions in Deutsche
Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Beauvais.1 85 Harry Beauvais took out a
mortgage note from American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc.
("AHMSI") in February 2006.186 After Beauvais missed a few monthly
payments, AHMSI initiated a foreclosure proceeding in January 2007
and accelerated the debt.1 87 AHMSI ignored a court order to appear at
a case management conference and thus the case was dismissed in
December 2010.188 In a separate action, Beauvais's condominium
association, Aqua Master Association, Inc., commenced its own
foreclosure proceeding and took title to the property in 2011.189 In
December 2012, Deutsche Bank, the new putative owner of the
mortgage loan, commenced a foreclosure action citing Beauvais's
initial default as well as every payment after. 1 90 The condominium
182 Id. at 1008 (emphasis added).
183 Id. at 1007 (quoting Capital Bank v. Needle, 596 So. 2d 1134, 1138 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1992)).
184 Id. at 1008 ("We must also remember that foreclosure is an equitable remedy
and there may be some tension between a court's authority to adjudicate the equities
and the legal doctrine of res judicata. The ends of justice require that the doctrine of
res judicata not be applied so strictly so as to prevent mortgagees from being able to
challenge multiple defaults on a mortgage.").
185 Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Beauvais, 188 So. 3d 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2016) (en banc).186 Id. at 954-55.
187 Id. at 940.
188 Id. at 941.
189 Id. at 940.
190 Id.
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association raised an affirmative defense that the statute of limitations
had run, as Deutsche Bank's December 2012 filing date was at least five
years past the date of the acceleration claim in AHMSI's Complaint
filed in January 2007.191 The condominium association thus argued that
the debt was never decelerated. 192 Deutsche Bank, taking the lead from
Singleton, argued that each subsequent payment was a separate default
and thus a separate claim, each with its own statute of limitations. 193
The trial court granted the condominium association's motion to
dismiss, holding that the statute of limitations barred the claim. 194 The
trial court also stated that Singleton had no application to the present
case because Singleton involved a decision based on res judicata and
not the statute of limitations.1 95 On appeal, the Florida Third District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order barring the claim under
the statute of limitations.1 96 The court distinguished earlier Florida law
by stating in this case the initial claim was dismissed without prejudice,
which meant that the debt was not decelerated.1 97 Therefore there were
no "new payments" due because after acceleration there was only one
payment due: the entire amount of the accelerated loan.198 This holding
was consistent with Gullotta, which meant that after acceleration there
would only be one claim for the entire debt, not one for each installment
payment. 199
On rehearing en banc, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal
reversed, citing Singleton.20 0 The court expanded Singleton's holding
based on res judicata to apply to statute of limitations cases. 20 1 Largely
adopting the Singleton approach, the court held that each installment
payment was a separate claim, and therefore it had its own statute of
limitations as well.2 °2 Thus, as in res judicata scenarios, the bank was
191 Id.
192 Id. at 940-41 (alleging once the debt was accelerated, the bank had five years
to pursue a foreclosure action, thus in essence stating the debt had never
decelerated).
193 Id. at 941 (quoting the lower court's opinion).
194 Id. (quoting the lower court's opinion).
195 Id. (quoting the lower court's opinion).
196 Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Beauvais, No. 3D14-575, 2014 Fla. App.
LEXIS 20422, at * 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2014), rev'd on reh 'g en banc,
188 So. 3d 938 (2016).
197 Id. at *9-10.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Beauvais, 188 So. 3d at 941.
201 Id. at 944 ("Here we follow that choice. And, as have numerous post-
Singleton courts before us, we apply this determination, while made in the context of
a res judicata defense, to a statute of limitations defense.").
202 Id.
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not precluded from seeking missed installment payments within the
statute of limitations.23 Perhaps an even more explicit expansion of
Singleton (and a not very subtle clue to the Beauvais court's view of
foreclosure litigation) is provided in the court's express assertion that
whether a prior foreclosure suit was dismissed with or without prejudice
is irrelevant for res judicata and statute of limitations analysis
purposes.20 4 In other words, in this 2016 decision, years after Florida's
courts and the state bar association were nationally embarrassed by
exposure that the courts had permitted the filing of thousands of
fraudulent documents and claims, 20 5 the Florida Third District Court of
Appeal essentially concluded that even a case of dismissal with
prejudice for any reason, including fraud on the court, would not
preclude a bad actor from continually refiling against a given
homeowner.2 °6
After concluding that the "foreclosure exception" to res judicata
also applies to statute of limitations cases, and after ordering future
courts to ignore the reasons a prior unsuccessful claim might have been
dismissed, the Beauvais court cited factual statements of Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, the Business Law Section of the Florida Bar, and the Real
Property Probate and Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar in support
of the court's conclusions.20 7 While distinguishing and diminishing
cases presented by borrower and consumer advocates, the court thus
relied upon lending industry and lender bar statements as support for
the proposition that dismissal of an action for any reason means
automatic deceleration-the idea suggested by the earlier Pugh
decision.208 The court, while finding that dismissal does act as an
automatic deceleration without any affirmative act requirement on the
part of banks or lenders, did not cite or discuss other decisions holding
that an affirmative act was required to accelerate a loan. 20 9 Thus, under
203 Id.
204 Id. at 945.
205 See generally Robo-Litigation, supra note 22, at 872-80, 884-88 (examining
the "sketchy" foreclosure practices of various Florida law firms and the responses
from the Florida Attorney General and State Bar).
206 See Beauvais, 188 So. 3d at 946 ("[T]he 'with' or 'without' prejudice'
dismissal is a distinction without a difference." (citations omitted)). Again, this
appears to be a statement that the Third District only applies to foreclosure litigation.
See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Bartram, 140 So. 3d 1007, 1012 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2014), aff'd, 211 So. 3d 1009 (Fla. 2016), reh 'g denied, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 593 (Fla.
Mar. 17, 2017).
207 Beauvais, 188 So. 3d at 947-50.
208 Id.; see Olympia Mortg. Corp. v. Pugh, 774 So. 2d 863, 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (confirming that voluntary dismissal of foreclosure action on an
accelerated mortgage and note did not bar a subsequent action on a later default).
209 Beauvais, 188 So. 3d at 947-50.
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the Beauvais court's reasoning, a statute of limitations clock for
acceleration does not occur until a foreclosing entity takes an
affirmative act.210 Yet to decelerate, no such requirement is needed.211
Unsurprisingly, both of these inconsistent holdings are to the sole
detriment of homeowners raising any sort of statute of limitations
defense.212
The dissent of Judge Scales pointed out the many deficiencies in the
majority's decision and noted its singular expansion of Singleton-a
case which the dissent notes does not even mention the statute of
limitations once.2 3 Aside from disagreeing with this extension of a res
judicata case to a statute of limitations issue, Judge Scales noted several
compelling disagreements with the majority opinion.214 First, the
dissent understood Beauvais to improperly suggest that the installment
nature of a contract is unaffected by the acceleration of the note.2 5 The
majority opinion, in Judge Scales's view, created a "court-imposed
fiction that, after acceleration, subsequent monthly installment
payments somehow continue to become due. ' 216 In other words, a loan
could be accelerated, tied up in court for years, and a bank or lender
could continuously demand the full accelerated amount. Yet upon
dismissal, the same bank may sue for any one of the defaults during that
same time period in which they demanded the full amount. 2 7 This is
"irreconcilable," in Judge Scales's view, with "decades of case law
holding that a loan acceleration-whether automatic or exercised at the
option of the lender-causes the entire indebtedness immediately to
become due.
2 18
Aside from creating the "fiction" of continuous installment
payments coming due regardless of acceleration, Judge Scales noted, as
noted above, that the Beauvais majority extends to every dismissal, no
matter the reason or the issues adjudicated in such dismissal, the
presumption that acceleration and/or default has been disproven and
that the installment payment duties are reinstituted automatically.21 9
Again, this simplistically "discounts the dramatic variances that can
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 959; see Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Fla.
2004).
213 Beauvais, 188 So. 3d at 966-68 (Scales, J., dissenting).
214 Id. at 959, 967.
215 Id. at 963.
216 Id. at 962.
217 Id. at 962-63 n.21.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 959.
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result from different dismissal orders. ' 22' Further, Judge Scales noted
inconsistency between the majority's view that acceleration does not
end the installment nature of a loan and its view that dismissal
automatically places parties back in their pre-acceleration places: "If
acceleration does not terminate the installment nature of the loan, then
dismissal is also irrelevant because acceleration has not altered the
parties' status quo in the first place. 221
Judge Scales also suggested that automatic reinstatement of the loan
upon dismissal is not something that would be granted in the event a
borrower moved for it at the end of a case where acceleration and default
were not at issue.2 22 The majority, in what Scales deems a procedurally
unfair fashion, nevertheless grants automatic reinstatement to lenders,
which is a benefit when seeking to avoid the harsh statute of limitations
preclusion.223
Finally, Judge Scales noted the incredible deference granted to
lenders and foreclosing entities by the wholesale extension of Singleton
to statute of limitations cases.22 4 He noted that "it seems that equitable
considerations-rather than any explicit pronouncement in Singleton-
fuel the majority opinion's sweeping construction of Singleton. 225
Such equitable considerations may have been appropriate for a res
judicata case like Singleton, but statutes of limitation are purely
legislative processes predicated on public policy, not any judicially
intuited sense of fairness.226 Accordingly, Judge Scales posits, the
majority's equitable powers should not interfere with what is supposed
to be a "province of the legislative branch. 227
Eventually, the Florida Supreme Court, in Bartram v. U.S. Bank
National Ass 'n, adopted the holding in Beauvais that the installment
nature of the contract continued despite acceleration and that Singleton
fully applies to statute of limitations cases. 228 Lewis Bartram, obligated
220 Id. at 961 n.19.
221 Id. at 959 n.15.
222 Id. at 964.
223 See id. at 964-65 ("In my view, this conclusion turns procedural fairness on
its head by giving the sanctioned party (the lender) the after-the-fact benefit of
reinstatement: a remedy that the prevailing party (the borrower) never would
receive.").
224 See id. at 966 ("[B]y allowing the lender's acceleration and potential re-
accelerations to keep delaying the operation of the statute of limitations, the majority
establishes the note's maturity date as the only date that can trigger application of the
five-year statute of limitations.").
225 Id. at 968.
226 Id. at 967.
227 Id. at 967.
228 Bartram v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 211 So. 3d 1009, 1022 (Fla. 2016), reh 'g
denied, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 593 (Fla. Mar. 17, 2017).
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to purchase his ex-wife's interest in their property pursuant to a divorce
agreement, obtained a loan through Finance America LLC in the
amount of $650,000 in February 2005.229 That loan was subsequently
assigned to U.S. Bank.23 ° On January 1, 2006, Bartram stopped making
payments.231 In May 2006, U.S. Bank filed a foreclosure complaint and
accelerated the debt. 232 Nearly five years later, the suit was
involuntarily dismissed after the bank failed to appear at a case
management conference.233
Following that dismissal, which occurred more than five years after
acceleration, Bartram filed a motion to cancel the promissory note and
to release the lien of the mortgage.2 34 The trial court denied this request
due to lack of jurisdiction given that an adjudication on the merits had
already occurred. 235 Bartram filed a similar crossclaim against U.S.
Bank a year later in a separate foreclosure action that his ex-wife had
brought against U.S. Bank and Bartram.236 The trial court granted
summary judgment and quieted title to Bartram.237 The court denied a
rehearing and U.S. Bank appealed to the Florida Fifth District Court of
Appeal, which essentially adopted Singleton wholesale.238
Accepting jurisdiction as a question of great public importance, the
Florida Supreme Court held that subsequent suits were not barred and
accepted Beauvais's reasoning that the installment nature of the contract
remained. 23 9 The court, citing a number of state court and federal court
229 Id. at 1013.
230 Id.




2 35 Id. at 1014-15.
236 Id. at 1015 ("Approximately a year later, after the dismissal of the
foreclosure action and almost six years after the Bank filed its foreclosure complaint,
Bartram filed a crossclaim against the Bank in a separate foreclosure action Patricia
had brought against Bartram, the Bank, and the HOA. Bartram's crossclaim sought
a declaratory judgment to cancel the Mortgage and to quiet title to the Property,
asserting that the statute of limitations barred the Bank from bringing another
foreclosure action.").
237 Id.
238 U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Bartram, 140 So. 3d 1007, 1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2014), aff'd, 211 So. 3d 1009 (Fla. 2016), reh 'g denied, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 593 (Fla.
Mar. 17, 2017).
239 Bartram, 211 So. 3d at 1019 ("Consistent with the reasoning of Singleton,
the statute of limitations on the balance under the note and mortgage would not
continue to run after an involuntary dismissal, and thus the mortgagee would not be
barred by the statute of limitations from filing a successive foreclosure action
premised on a 'separate and distinct' default. Rather, after the dismissal, the parties
are simply placed back in the same contractual relationship as before, where the
continued...
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decisions since Singleton, adopted the expansion and extension of res
judicata analysis to statute of limitations questions. 240
The Bartram court next wrestled with the many criticisms of
Singleton's singular disregard of the various effects that different
dismissals can implicate.241 Instead of describing the innumerable
reasons dismissal could occur and the various implications of any such
dismissal, the court broadly stated that whether a dismissal is with or
without prejudice only affects a lender's ability to collect on past
defaults, not any future defaults.242  Accordingly, it would not be
hyperbole to say that under this interpretation, a bank can lie, cheat, and
steal 243 during the pendency of a foreclosure case, receive a dismissal
of its cause (which requires payment of all sums due under the entire
note and mortgage for the life of the loan) with prejudice as a sanction
for repugnant conduct, and emerge relatively unscathed with a new
lawsuit based upon an arbitrarily picked later default date.244 And while
the court relies upon uniform mortgages' reinstatement provisions to
assert that dismissal places the parties back in the positions they were
in prior to the lawsuit, this is patently misleading-the reinstatement
clause typically requires, for example, that borrower pay lenders all of
their legal expenses in the first lawsuit before reinstatement can be given
effect.245 Again, this is without any regard to why the suit was
dismissed in the first place and independent of the presence of fraud,
disregard of court orders, or any other improper foreclosure litigation
246practices.
Perhaps most remarkable is the Bartram court's contention that its
decision is in fact pro-borrower: failure to agree with its interpretations
of the reinstatement clause would mean borrowers still owe the
accelerated amount even after a dismissal, which could "[lead] to an
unavoidable default. 247 Of course, this decision completely ignores
residential mortgage remained an installment loan, and the acceleration of the
residential mortgage declared in the unsuccessful foreclosure action is revoked.").
241 Id. at 1018_19.
241 Id. at 1020.
242 Id.
243 See Robo-Litigation, supra note 22, at 885.
244 Bartram, 211 So. 3d at 1020 ("Whether the dismissal of the initial
foreclosure action by the court was with or without prejudice may be relevant to the
mortgagee's ability to collect on past defaults. However, it is entirely consistent
with, and follows from, our reasoning in Singleton that each subsequent default
accruing after the dismissal of an earlier foreclosure action creates a new cause of
action, regardless of whether that dismissal was entered with or without prejudice.").
245 Id. at 1013.
246 Id. at 1020.
247 Id. at 1021 (alteration in original).
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that in a dismissal scenario, months or years after a case was filed, many
months of payments and expenses will be owed.248 Thus, there is no
functional difference for the average distressed borrower (many of
whom are too impoverished even to afford legal counsel) between
demanding an accelerated sum and demanding a reinstatement sum of
years of defaults and accompanying expenses.249 Worse, the court
describes a world in which banks might accept regular monthly
payments immediately after a dismissal that, under the revised doctrine,
automatically decelerates the loan. 250 Again, reinstatement requires
payment of all past due amounts and all expenses so far incurred by the
bank. 25 1 Accordingly, it is inconceivable that a bank would be required
to, or would actually accept, a borrower's regular monthly payment
amount immediately after protracted litigation.
Each installment payment, the Bartram decision held, could be a
separate default, meaning it was its own claim for res judicata purposes
and thus each claim had its own statute of limitations.252 In so doing,
the court implicitly rejected Stadler.253
Finally, the Bartram court held that whether an involuntary
dismissal occurred with or without prejudice did not matter for purposes
of the new lawsuit.254 The distinction only mattered if banks wanted to
pursue the same defaulted payment as before.255 If the first lawsuit was
dismissed with prejudice, then that default could not be pursued again,
however any future payments were recoverable in future lawsuits. 256 A
dismissal without prejudice would allow the bank to pursue the same
default as the first lawsuit.
257
248 Id. at 1020.
249 Id. at 1021.
251 Id. at 1023.
251 Id. at 1020.
252 Id. at 1019.
253 Id. at 1016 ("Stadler also involved two successive foreclosure actions where
the first foreclosure action had been dismissed with prejudice. The mortgagee
brought a second foreclosure action that was identical except for alleging a different
period of default. That action was successful, and the mortgagor appealed. The
Second District reversed the judgment of foreclosure entered on the basis of res
judicata and concluded that the 'election to accelerate put the entire balance,
including future installments at issue.' Therefore, even though different periods of
default were asserted, the 'entire amount due' was the same and thus the 'actions are
identical.' Accordingly, the Second District concluded that res judicata barred the
second foreclosure action." (quoting and citing Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers,
Inc., 150 So. 2d 468, 469, 472-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963))).
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Judge Lewis's concurrence in Barlram noted apprehension at the
approach that gives any sort of dismissal, for any reason, the effect of
automatic deceleration. 2 8 This was particularly troubling where there
are no facts in the record to show even a hint of "de facto reinstatement"
following the initial dismissal.25 9 Judge Lewis echoed the dissent of
Judge Scales in the Beauvais case, pointing out again that the equitable
considerations that led courts in Florida to create exceptions for banks
and lenders should not govern statute of limitations cases.26 °
III. UNDERSTANDING ACCELERATION AND RES JUDICATA AND
STATUTE OF LIMITATION CASES
Our previous research has established a number of patterns in
judicial treatment of foreclosure cases. 26 We have noted that an
unceasing drive for faster foreclosure processing time resulted in less
procedural and substantive due process protections for homeowners,
and undoubtedly contributed to the impressive number of false and
fraudulent documents filed in state courts around the country.2 62 We
also described an overall trend of courts narrowing novel defenses to
foreclosures that have arisen in the wake of the Great Recession. 263 As
a result, our research has painted a picture of a specific and narrow area
of law in which the party with the most resources seems to largely
receive the benefit of any judicial doubt. The virtual destruction of the
statute of limitations and res judicata in Florida as to foreclosure cases,
and the singularly expansive rulings given in favor of banks and
foreclosing entities in the cases discussed supra fit neatly into the
258 Id. at 1023 (Lewis, J., concurring in the result) ("Given the procedural
posture of this matter and the relatively sparse record before this Court, the decision
today fails to address evidentiary concerns regarding how to determine the manner in
which a mortgage may be reinstated following the dismissal of a foreclosure action,
as well as whether a valid 'subsequent and separate' default occurred to give rise to a
new cause of action. See Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1008 (Fla.
2004). Instead of addressing these concerns, the Court flatly holds that the dismissal
itself-for any reason-'decelerates' the mortgage and restores the parties to their
positions prior to the acceleration without authority for support.").
259 Id. ("In this case, there is no evidence contained in the record before this
Court to show whether the parties tacitly agreed to a 'de facto reinstatement'
following the dismissal of the previous foreclosure action. Further, despite the
assumption of the majority of the Court to the contrary, the mortgage itself did not
create a right to reinstatement following acceleration and the dismissal of a
foreclosure action.").
260 Id. at 1024.
261 See, e.g., A Standing Question, supra note 17, at 708-11.
262 See id. at 729; Not a Party, supra note 14, at 182-83.
263 See Not a Party, supra note 14, at 179-80, 182-83.
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pattern we have established. 264 Ultimately, as we have argued
previously, the failures of the judiciary lead to negative externalities that
were ignored or downplayed in the lender-friendly opinions we
examined.265
A. The Typical Frame of Foreclosure
We begin by attempting to shed light on why research seems to
show that judges are inclined to overlook irregularities in the
foreclosure process or to modify doctrine to liberally permit
foreclosures.266 As discussed in the sections above, courts often cite
equitable concerns, particularly the desire to avoid awarding "free
houses" to debtors that have defaulted on their mortgages.267 These
equitable concerns, however, are necessarily rooted in a particular and
narrow view of the mortgage and foreclosure process. 268 Accordingly,
it is important to discuss the "frames" themselves.
Upon examination, it is clear that judges may be predisposed to
discount debtor defenses because of how foreclosure cases are situated
within the judicial system. Given the backlog of foreclosures during the
height of the housing crisis, judges were under apparent pressure to
resolve these cases as expeditiously as possible. 269 The courts' ability
to do so may even be tied to the funding for the courts.270 Judges
unsurprisingly may be reluctant to seriously consider defenses,
particularly those that merely act as a "stall" to an otherwise valid
claim.271
264 See Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1005 (Fla. 2004);
Olympia Mortg. Corp. v. Pugh, 774 So. 2d 863, 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(illustrating recent cases in Florida that have essentially eviscerated the protections
of the statute of limitations and res judicata); Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, 150
So. 2d 468, 469-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
265 See A Standing Question, supra note 17, at 730; see also infra text
accompanying note 304.
266 A Standing Question, supra note 17, at 729.
267 Singleton, 882 So. 2d at 1008.
268 Id.
269 See, e.g., Foreclosure Initiative Workgroup, Foreclosure Backlog Reduction
Plan for the State Courts System, FLA. CTS. 6 (Apr. 10, 2013),
http://www.flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/25 1/urlt/RecommendationsForeclosurelni
tiativeWorkgroup.pdf (proposing a process to clear foreclosure backlogs).
270 See id. at 4 (discussing docket clearance rates and their link to court funding).
271 Allen, supra note 5 (describing shortcuts that some Florida courts took to
facilitate fast resolution at the expense of many homeowners); Adolfo Pesquera,
Miami-Dade Aggressively Pushes Foreclosure Cases Through System, DAILY Bus.
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We have previously noted immense judicial skepticism to debtor
defenses based on the assumed underlying culpability of debtors.272 For
example, with rare exception courts were largely silent and unobtrusive
amid the marching onslaught of MERS, the electronic placeholder that
acts as nominal mortgagee for lenders for the life of loans, eliminating
the need for many assignments of loans to be recorded. 273 This new
tracking system reduced recording revenues by millions, and reduced
transparency in public records by lowering the likelihood of any given
homeowner being able to access the correct current owner of his or her
loan.274 Similarly, its development led to inaccurate and contradictory
pleadings all across the nation.275 Yet it appears that in the majority of
jurisdictions, judges have ruled that MERS will not face significant
financial liability for its conduct and judges have largely accepted the
arguments of MERS and its attorneys at face value.276
Similarly, we have noted that courts have tended to ignore debtor
defenses based on standing.277 Again, with rare exception, many courts
imply, or indeed occasionally express, the posture that to whom the debt
is owed is largely irrelevant, as long as a given case seems plausible.278
Discovery may also be routinely denied based upon the existence of the
debtors' default.279
judge as saying, "If you can't do [the trial] within an hour, you're not a trial
attorney").
272 A Standing Question, supra note 17, at 711.
273 Standing in Our Own Sunshine, supra note 16, at 551-52, 555.
274 Id. at 552.
275 Id.
276 Cf Taylor v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 44 So. 3d 618, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2010) (finding that MERS could arguably be a proper holder of promissory
notes).
277 See, e.g., Not a Party, supra note 14, at 182; Pino v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon,
No. SCll -697, 2011 WL 1537260, at *1 (Fla. Apr. 15, 2011).
278 Maraulo v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 12-CV-10250, 2013 WL 530944, at *7
(E.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2013) ("Furthermore, none of the facts alleged indicate that the
assignment may subject Plaintiffs to a risk of having to pay their mortgage twice. In
fact, Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the assignor of the mortgage, American, went
out of business in 2008 and ceased to exist as a corporate entity. Given that the
assignor does not exist, Plaintiffs are not at any risk of paying the same claim twice,
and have never alleged that they are at risk of such double payment." (citations
omitted)); Shumake v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., No. 1:11-CV-353, 2012 WL
366923, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2012) ("Really, Shumake's injury is fairly
traceable to the fact that he failed to make his mortgage payments ... whether
Shumake made his mortgage payments on time had nothing to do with whether
Chase validly assigned the mortgage to Deutsche Bank. Either way, Shumake still
had to make the same payments-the assignment only altered to whom he made the
payments; the assignment had no other consequence to Shumake." (citations
omitted)).
279 Consider, as one example, a sitting judge recently submitted an article to the
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Such foreclosure decisions, as with other judicial decisions, are
often framed and influenced by the perceived primary actor in the
conflict. 280 In other words, judges often appear to imagine the most
likely counterfactual scenario that would have avoided the foreclosure
situation and thereby determine the "but for" cause of foreclosure.28 1 It
may seem obvious, then, that judges would perceive debtors' default to
be the primary cause for the situation and therefore be inclined to be
more sympathetic to the mortgagee, the aggrieved party in this instance.
For example, in many states, there are judges assigned to particular
areas of the law, such as foreclosures.282 Their repeated exposure to
similar cases perhaps causes cynicism and skepticism regarding
borrower defenses. Judges consequently choose to frame the issues as
one of "deadbeat" borrowers that are seeking to take advantage of a
bank that inadvertently failed to follow up on a claim after acceleration
within the statute of limitations. 283 There may be some truth to this
stereotype, of course; homeowners may readily admit that they are
seeking legal counsel in order to gain as much time as possible before
having to settle, whether through a loan modification or a short sale.284
This can be particularly true of investors in rental property, who may
Florida bar that suggests that all notes are negotiable. See William H. Burgess, III,
Negotiability of Promissory Notes in Foreclosure Cases: Ballast Is Not Luggage, 88
FLA. B.J., 8, 10, 18 (2014). This is troubling on a number of levels, (1) that a sitting
judge-and the previous head of all foreclosure cases for a Florida county-felt
impelled to dissuade others from attempting to assert a defense based on failure to
meet holder status under the Uniform Commercial Code in foreclosure cases, and (2)
that he also would clearly attempt to influence other judges to preclude any inquiry
in individual cases regarding whether or not a given note is a negotiable instrument
by making broad pronouncements about all uniform promissory notes based largely
on out-of-state cases. See id. at 18.
280 See A Standing Question, supra note 17, at 708.
81 ee id at 725-26.
282 See, e.g., Alison Fitzgerald, Homeowners Steamrolled as Florida Courts
Clear Foreclosure Backlog, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 10, 2014),
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/09/10/15463/homeowners-steamrolled-florida-
courts-clear-foreclosure-backlog; Juan Gonzales, Brooklyn Court Overwhelmed by
Way of Foreclosures, N.Y. DAILY NEws (Mar. 8, 2016),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/brooklyn-court-overwhelmed-
wave-foreclosures-article-i .2557744.
283 See In re Washington, No. 14-14573-TBA, 2014 WL 5714586, at *1
(Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2014) ("No one gets a free house."), rev'd sub nom.,
Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC v. Washington, 2:14-CV-8063-SDW, 2015 WL
4757924 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2015), aff'd sub nom., In re Washington, 669 Fed. App'x
87 (3d Cir. 2016).
284 See generally Lambros Politis, How Can I Slow or Stop the Foreclosure
Process?, ARK L. GROUP (Nov. 25, 2013), https://www.arklawgroup.com/blog/how-
can-i-slow-or-stop-the-foreclosure-process (providing general advice on foreclosure
delay tactics).
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heavily leverage to finance the initial purchase of the real estate and
then lease it to tenants.285 The investors have very little skin in the game
and may collect rent while delaying an otherwise valid foreclosure
claim, with very little downside.286
Judges also are undoubtedly aware of the financial arrangements for
many foreclosure defense attorneys, which can contribute to reluctance
to seriously consider debtor defenses.287 When foreclosure proceedings
have begun, many foreclosure defense attorneys in judicial foreclosure
states offer to defend the proceedings for a monthly fee that is
substantially less than the mortgage payment.288 In other words, one
way of conceptualizing foreclosure defense is as an inexpensive option
to lengthen proceedings and stall the inevitable. Any delay by virtue of
defending a cause, however, is valuable to debtors that consequently
will be permitted to stay in their homes for a monthly fee that is a
fraction of their monthly mortgage payment.289 Judicial distaste for the
stalling of an otherwise valid claim, particularly in light of the
underlying financial arrangement that benefits both the debtor and the
debtor's attorney the longer the claim is stalled, may affect the reception
of asserted foreclosure defenses. In some instances, this distaste has
even manifested itself in the court's willingness to rely on the unsworn
amici of the banking bar as to the proper interpretation of the contract
and acceleration rights.290
Confirming this assertion, in response to debtor assertions of
defenses or even at the outset of the case, judges often seek to confirm
that the debtor did not in fact pay as required (e.g., "But your client did
285 See A Standing Question, supra note 17, at 727-28 n. 114.
286 See id.
287 See generally id. at 705 (providing examples of judges' skepticism toward
debtor defenses).
288 See How Much Will a Foreclosure Attorney Charge?, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/how-much-will-foreclosure-attorney-
charge.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
289 Id.
29' Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Beauvais, 188 So. 3d 938, 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2016) (en banc) ("Adding support to our conclusion, both The Business Law
Section of The Florida Bar and The Real Property Probate & Trust Law Section of
The Florida Bar confirm that the custom and practice in Florida is to treat a dismissal
of a foreclosure action as 'decelerating' an acceleration made in a foreclosure
action."); see Cooke v. Commercial Bank of Miami, 119 So. 2d 732, 735 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1960) ("Although customs and usages of the banking business may have a
binding force as between banks, and between a bank and the person with whom it
deals in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary."); see also Sabatino v.
Curtiss Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs, 446 F.2d 1046, 1053 (5th Cir. 1971) ("Absent
instructions or an express agreement to the contrary, general customs and usage of
the banking business may have a binding effect between banks, and between a bank
and the person with whom it deals.").
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not actually pay, correct?") or to express a concern about awarding free
houses to someone that defaulted (e.g., "We are not going to be
awarding free houses").2 9 1 While this sentiment may seem appropriate,
it actually is misplaced in that it unfairly previews the case outcome. In
other civil contexts, it would be intuitively inappropriate for a judge at
the outset (or in response to an asserted defense) to assert the propriety
or likelihood of victory of the plaintiff's claim. 292 In a more extreme
example, it would clearly strike us as improper if a judge blithely
dismissed or ignored access to counsel or discovery in a criminal case
because "your client committed the crime, right?" 293 This is not, of
course, to suggest that previewing does not occur in these other
circumstances but instead to assert that it is improper in each instance.
B. A New "Systemic" Frame of Foreclosure
In light of this Article's discussion of yet another longstanding
substantive area of law being changed, modified, or amended post-
Great Recession for the benefit of banks and lenders, another frame
must also be discussed. Separate and apart from individual judges
"previewing" a case's merits before making substantive decisions, in
the manner we have discussed above and in previous research, we may
also posit that judicial systems and court administration create what we
may call a new "systemic" frame in which judges view foreclosure. In
this new conception of a systemic frame, we posit that judicial systems
as a whole, in response to the Great Recession, created structures,
procedures, and requirements that were largely to the detriment of
borrowers. Accordingly, we may say that court systems, before a given
case is even assigned to a judge, have primed the judiciary, or framed
the proceedings, for what the "optimal" reaction to foreclosure litigation
should be.
In some jurisdictions, special foreclosure procedures, rules, and
291 See, e.g., Michael Corkery, Foreclosure to Home Free, as 5-Year Clock
Expires, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/3 0/business/foreclosure-to-home-free-as-5-year-
clock-expires.html ("'No one gets a free house,' Judge Michael B. Kaplan of
the United States Bankruptcy Court in Trenton wrote in an opinion late last year,
reflecting what he characterized as a longstanding 'admonition' he and others made
during the foreclosure crisis."); Fox 4 News Investigates Lee County's "'Rocket
Docket" Program, 4CLOSUREFRAUD (Sept. 16, 2010),
http://4closure fraud.org/2010/09/1 6/fox-4-news-investigates-lee-countys-rocket-
docket-program/ ("I was specifically told by one judge, counselor stop. I have 180
cases on my docket this morning. I've heard all the evidence I'm going hear. The
defendant didn't pay the mortgage, we're done here.").
292 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.10 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2011).
293 See id.
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even court divisions were created, wherein cases would be sent to trial
en masse, leaving little time for each individual case, even for a judge
so inclined to hear cases on their merits.294 Pejoratively termed the
"rocket docket," the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU")
challenged one instance of such a mass foreclosure docket, noting that
the special procedures were not authorized by "statute, local rule, or
administrative order. '295 The ACLU's brief exposed what many have
argued: that judges facing immense caseloads, in the face of what are
seen as "simple" cases of defaulting homeowners, may disregard
application of what may be seen as technicalities. One judge in
particular is cited as saying, "I have 180 cases on my docket this
morning. . . . The defendant didn't pay the mortgage, we're done
here.
296
While this is obviously an example of an individual judge framing
an entire case and its proof on one anti-homeowner fact ("didn't pay the
mortgage"), we suggest that the court system already framed the case
by virtue of scheduling it at once with 179 other cases. In other words,
before a given case reaches a judge's desk, court administration has
already framed the case so as to be by necessity tilted against any
effective defense to foreclosure.29 Similarly, creating entire divisions
dedicated solely to foreclosure cases may contribute to the inherent idea
that such cases are less important than other divisions, especially when
such divisions often employ retired, unelected judges to assist in
processing large numbers of cases.298 Such judges were not presumably
called up by the court system to assist in discovering the truth of each
individual case or to sniff out possible fraud or misconduct on either
side -rather, they were explicitly called in to assist in closing cases.2 99
294 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 5.
295 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 1-2.
296 Id. at 16.
297 It should also be posited here that in facing unprecedented numbers of
foreclosures, it was by no means clear that the court system would take the sharp
turn towards pro-lender overtures. In light of the credible accounts of thousands of
false documents soiling court records, courts surely could have taken a different tack
and forced procedures and requirements on banks to ensure that cases with lack of
proof are not brought to court. Faced with thousands of complaints that falsely
claimed original notes were lost, for example, Florida required lenders to begin
having their complaints verified under penalty of perjury by their clients. See FLA.
STAT. § 702.015 (2017). While this requirement could have created a systemic
frame of priming judges to be aware and vigilant towards possible bank misconduct,
it may have actually contributed to the further "ghettoization" of foreclosure
litigation in the sense that any reputable practice area worth expending time upon
would not have required such a new rule of procedure.
298 See Allen, supra note 5.
299 See id. ("[J]udges [were] brought back from retirement specifically to hear
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Thus, while we have previously posited that judges preview the merits
of individual foreclosure claims and discount homeowner claims
accordingly, 00 we now suggest that the overall systemic frame of court
administration responses to the foreclosure crisis enforced and created
an atmosphere of almost ministerial enforcement or of a collection
mechanism rather than serving any truth-seeking function.
Framing lawsuits primarily in terms of efficiency rather than fact-
finding renders foreclosure a foregone conclusion, especially when
judges have an incentive to clear a large backlog of foreclosure cases
such as those pending after the 2008 financial crisis. 01 While perhaps
easier or faster than dealing with every case as it should be, this type of
thinking can be crushing for debtors when there are many other options
for lenders that promote an efficient mortgage market. 302 It is
particularly bad for society in the long haul, whether it leads to increased
crime rates in neighborhoods, blight, or other negative externalities. 03
Within these two frames, therefore, the story of the creation of brand
new exceptions to res judicata and the statutes of limitation solely for
foreclosure cases are altogether unsurprising.
C. An Equitable Approach Where Equity Does Not Apply
Almost ninety years ago, then-Chief Judge Cardozo protested, to no
avail, a formalistic approach to mortgage enforcement that ignored the
foreclosures in Fort Myers." (alteration in original)).
300 See A Standing Question, supra note 17, at 727.
301 Id. at 729 ("What is clear, though, is that foreclosure is desirable from a
judicial perspective. Judges have been, implicitly or explicitly, charged with the task
of clearing the backlog of foreclosures and have accordingly carved a legal path that
enables foreclosures to occur more quickly and with less attorney effort.").
302 Id. at 727 ("Under these lines of analysis, if the foreclosure is inevitable
because the debtor is in default and the lender would necessarily desire a foreclosure,
then the courts should not put up unnecessary roadblocks to foreclosure by
permitting procedural challenges. These approaches, however, are deeply flawed
because they are both predicated on an underlying assumption that foreclosure would
and should occur whenever the debtor is in default.").
303 Id. at 730 ("Yet this approach, as with the other housing crisis issues driven
largely by a demand for faster results, is ultimately shortsighted. First, although a
longer foreclosure process costs lenders and servicers more, these costs may help
incentivize servicers to settle more cases, rather than enduring a long slog through
the court system. Similarly, the longer time period may assist borrowers in
bolstering their financial resources or in weathering a financial hardship, again
making settlement more likely. Encouraging more settlements benefits society as a
whole, particularly those jurisdictions that have had higher numbers of foreclosures.
This is because preventing foreclosures can help eliminate significant negative
externalities. The normal neighborhood-level effects of foreclosed homes are
significant in terms of crime, blight, and reduced property values.").
continued...
2018] LOAN ACCELERATION AND 435
DIMINISHING FORECLOSURE DEFENSES
impact of foreclosure.3 °4 In Graf v. Hope Building Corp., through an
error in a bookkeeper's arithmetic, payment of what should have been
an installment of $6,121.56 was $401.87 short of the correct amount.30 5
Enforcement of the acceleration provision (as sustained by the majority)
meant that because of the $401.87 deficiency, the mortgagor's interest
was foreclosed in a property mortgaged for $335,000.306 The majority
chose to permit acceleration and foreclosure based on the clear terms of
the contract.30 7 In his dissent, Chief Judge Cardozo argued:
In this case, the hardship is so flagrant, the oppression so
apparent, as to justify a holding that only through an
acceptance of the tender will equity be done .... The
deficiency, though not so small as to be negligible within
the doctrine of de minimis, was still slight and
unimportant when compared with the payment duly
made.308
As Chief Judge Cardozo's view did not prevail, one would expect
the formalism that was used to justify foreclosure would also be
employed when lenders fail to comply with statutory, common law, or
contractual requirements with respect to mortgage assignment,
enforcement, acceleration, or foreclosure.
In each instance, however, lenders are often instead protected by a
contextual or equitable approach that seeks to preserve their right to
foreclose. 30 9 As we have suggested elsewhere, courts use a formalistic
approach with respect to debtor accountability, but not mortgagee
accountability, under the contract.31 0 Mortgagees are permitted to
enforce loan and mortgage instruments under virtually all
circumstances, even where the contracting circumstances are suspect or
where the mortgagee's title to the underlying instruments is
questionable.31
304 Grafv. Hope Bldg. Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 886 (N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo, C.J.,
dissenting).
305 Id. at 884 (majority opinion).
306 Id. at 885.
307 Id. ("We feel that the interests of certainty and security in real estate
transactions forbid us, in the absence of fraud, bad faith or unconscionable conduct,
to recede from the doctrine that is so deeply imbedded in equity.").
308 Id. at 889 (Cardozo, C.J., dissenting).
309 See Basil H. Mattingly, The Shift from Power to Process: A Functional
Approach to Foreclosure Law, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 77, 92-93 n.76 (1996).
310 A Standing Question, supra note 17, at 707 ("In somewhat counterintuitive
fashion, however, courts have permitted mortgagees and their assignees to subvert,
supplant, and circumvent the very formalities that they utilize to foreclose upon the
debtors in the first place.").
311 Id.
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In the context of res judicata and the statute of limitations, courts
have pursued a contextual or equitable approach to preserve the ability
of mortgagors to foreclose.3 12 As seen in Beauvais, courts create a legal
fiction that all dismissals, voluntary or not, of foreclosure of an
accelerated debt, represent a judicial adjudication that acceleration was
improper or ineffective, thereby permitting mortgagors to accelerate
and seek foreclosure innumerable times.313 As seen in Bartram, courts
permit a contractual vagueness with respect to the deceleration of a debt
to be construed in favor of the drafter, despite the disparity in bargaining
power or the inability of a debtor to negotiate the underlying
contracts.314
One way to understand the inclination of some courts to permit the
erosion of res judicata and statute of limitations defenses is ensuring
consistency with their equitable inclination in other doctrinal contexts
to liberalize the foreclosure process and to prevent debtors in default
from being awarded "free houses."31 5  This equitable inclination,
however, is particularly problematic in the context of the defenses of res
judicata, double-dismissal rules and statute of limitations. Equity
312 Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Beauvais, 188 So. 3d 938, 943 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2016) (en banc).
313 Id. at 947 ("Stated another way, despite acceleration of the balance due and
the filing of an action to foreclose, the installment nature of a loan secured by such a
mortgage continues until a final judgment of foreclosure is entered and no action is
necessary to reinstate it via a notice of 'deceleration' or otherwise.").
314 Bartram v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 211 So. 3d 1009, 1024 (Fla. 2016) (Lewis,
J., concurring in the result) ("The majority opinion rewrites the parties' note and
mortgage to create a reinstatement provision-i.e., reinstating the installment nature
of the note, as if acceleration never occurred, upon any dismissal of any lawsuit-
that the parties did not include when drafting their documents. Singleton does not
say this; the parties' contract documents certainly do not say this; and Florida law is
repugnant to the majority's insertion of a provision into the parties' private contract
that the parties themselves most assuredly omitted." (quoting Beauvais, 188 So. 3d
at 963)), reh 'g denied, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 593 (Fla. Mar. 17, 2017).
315 Fairbank's Capital Corp. v. Milligan, 234 F. App'x 21, 24 (3d Cir. 2007) ("If
we were to so hold [that dismissal of a former lawsuit prevented the bank from going
after the mortgagor later], it would encourage a delinquent mortgagor to come to a
settlement with a mortgagee on a default in order to later insulate the mortgagor
from the consequences of a subsequent default. This is plainly nonsensical."
(alteration in original)); Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1007-08
(Fla. 2004) ("If res judicata prevented a mortgagee from acting on a subsequent
default even after an earlier claimed default could not be established, the mortgagor
would have no incentive to make future timely payments on the note. The
adjudication of the earlier default would essentially insulate her from future
foreclosure actions on the note-merely because she prevailed in the first action.
Clearly, justice would not be served if the mortgagee was barred from challenging
the subsequent default payment solely because he failed to prove the earlier alleged
default.").
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should not be relevant in these instances because it is the very nature of
such defenses to create inequitable results.3 16 The proper application of
res judicata or the double-dismissal rules will result in instances where
a valid substantive claim will be dismissed. 317 That is indeed
inequitable. Similarly, the proper application of the statute of
limitations will necessary result in the dismissal or preclusion of valid
substantive claims.318 It is unclear why a court would understand the
inequitable result arising from a disallowed foreclosure to be more
compelling than the inequitable results arising in other circumstances,
such as criminal acts or intentional torts that cannot be prosecuted or
pursued because of res judicata or statute of limitations defenses.
Further, upon examination and analysis of the preceding cases and
their development, it seems clear that many judges tend to see equity
lying with only one side of foreclosure litigation. In the majority
opinions we have discussed supra, the decisions consistently note the
"free house" scenario and warn against the inequities if homeowners
behaved opportunistically in the face of strict claim preclusion rules.3 19
These same decisions often accept at face value whatever factual
proclamation bank and lender industry groups pronounce.320 Yet, these
same decisions neither discuss-nor mention in their concurring or
dissenting opinions-the inequities that their pro-lender expansions
may produce.321
The conception of "free houses" suggests a lack of practical
knowledge of foreclosure litigation and, indeed, homeownership in
general. The cases we have discussed herein have been decided only
316 Beauvais, 188 So. 3d at 969 (Scales, J., dissenting) ("The expiration of a
statute of limitations, however, generally results in a windfall for the escaping
defendant. In my view, neither the moral imperative that borrowers pay their
obligations, nor Singleton, has abrogated decades of Florida jurisprudence governing
the statute of limitations in foreclosure cases.").
317 See Ronald D. Weiss, Who Wants a Free House? Applying Res Judicata to
Foreclosure Cases, RONALD D. WEISS P.C. (Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.ny-
bankruptcy.com/who-wants-a-free-house-applying-res-judicata-to-foreclosure-cases-
2/.
318 Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of
Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 465 (1997) ("[I]t may be more unjust to permit an old
claim to be revived than it would be to extinguish it." (citation omitted)).
319 See Bartram, 211 So. 3d at 1017; Beauvais, 188 So. 3d at 943-44; Singleton,
882 So. 2d at 1007.
320 See Bartram, 211 So. 3d at 1007; Beauvais, 188 So. 3d at 945; Singleton, 882
So. 2d at 1012.
321 See Bartram, 211 So. 3d at 1025-26 (Lewis, J., concurring in the result)
(noting that the majority's holding may lead to inequities to borrowers); Beauvais,
188 So. 3d at 964-65 (Scales, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority gives the
lender a benefit the borrower would never receive); see generally Singleton, 882 So.
2d at 1008 (discussing only inequities to the lender).
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after years of protracted litigation, multiple lawsuits, and presumably
extensive legal bills.322 The homeowner will have borne the costs of
the litigation and the deleterious health effects of foreclosure.3 23 And,
in many cases, the homeowner will have paid their loan faithfully for
years before any financial difficulties caused default, and others will
have been induced into default by servicers informing them that loss
mitigation assistance will not be available until they actually stop
making regular payments.324
In addition, in light of the case law development we have discussed,
it appears that banks and foreclosing entities will have nearly unlimited
chances to attempt foreclosure in those jurisdictions that have adopted
multiple-bites-at-the-apple positions.325 In such jurisdictions, while it
now appears nearly impossible to win an actual "free" house through a
dismissal, we hold little hope that judges will suddenly stop believing
and asserting that a "free house" is the ultimate outcome of any
dismissal, and that therefore homeowner defenses must be viewed with
skepticism.
Likewise, we do not expect courts to suddenly demand foreclosing
entities cease filing lengthy cases that are ultimately dismissed for
malfeasance or lack of proof-the very cases which, when refiled, can
sometimes implicate res judicata and statute of limitations
considerations. That is to say, having expanded the exceptions to claim
preclusion and the statute of limitations to give banks nearly unlimited
chance to foreclose without regard to the effects on homeowners, courts
still remain unlikely to change their allegiance to more thoroughly
consider the equities that lie with a given homeowner.3 26 In light of our
previous research and the continuing points made in this Article, we do
322 See Bartram, 211 So. 3d at 1014-15; Beauvais, 188 So. 3d at 940-41;
Singleton, 882 So. 2d at 1005.
323 See Foreclosure Process Takes Toll on Physical, Mental Health, ROBERT
WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (Oct. 21, 2011), https://www.rwj f.org/en/library/articles-
and-news/20 11/1 0/foreclosure-process-takes-toll-on-physical-mental-health.html
(identifying a link between foreclosure and a decline in overall health); What Will a
Foreclosure Lawyer Cost Me?, LEGALMATCH.COM,
https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/how-much-will-a-foreclosure-
lawyer-cost.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2017) (stating that usually each party pays its
own costs but that in some cases homeowners must pay the lender's legal fees as
well).
324 See, e.g., Aldo Svaldi, Foreclosure Paperwork Miscues Piling Up, DENVER
POST, https://www.denverpost.com/2010/11/12/foreclosure-paperwork-miscues-
piling-up/ (last updated May 5, 2016, 3:46 AM) (identifying foreclosures brought on
by injury and misleading statements by the lender).
325 See Bartram, 211 So. 3d at 1012 (following the Singleton rule); Beauvais,
188 So. 3d at 944 (following the Singleton rule).
326 See supra Section III.C.
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not expect judges to begin to recognize the extensive damage that
repetitive successive lawsuits can cause. 327 Indeed, in this new
landscape where foreclosure appears inevitable-even in the face of a
previous dismissal with prejudice for severely troubling conduct-one
may well expect forthcoming opinions to say it is inequitable to force a
foreclosing entity, who might otherwise win a suit, to have to refile for
the same relief later, despite any wrongdoing in the present case.
Finally, and again as we have discussed in prior research, we note
that foreclosing entities cannot be said to have earned the sympathies of
foreclosure courts to merit such one-sided examinations of the equities
of a given case.3 28 In other words, one cannot reasonably say that
strategic homeowners knowingly and wittingly created a backlog on
court systems in an effort to bilk lenders out of money despite banks'
best efforts to assist. 329 While ample evidence certainly exists to
suggest that many homeowners defaulted strategically,330 the far more
accurate scenario writ large is that millions of Americans faced financial
hardship through no fault of their own.3 3 1
Banks, lenders, and their attorneys, by contrast, have earned every
bit of disapprobation received in the past decade.33 2 Even if courts
ignored the substantial research on bank misconduct in the years before
the great recession, courts would have to be exceptionally inattentive
not to have noticed a similar amount of reportage on attorney
misconduct in foreclosure litigation:
Among a host of problematic practices, foreclosure
attorneys have been cited for signing documents on
behalf of servicers without having the authority to do so,
changing affidavits without knowledge of servicers,
filing a myriad of false or inappropriate claims in
pleadings, filing documents signed by attorneys who had
already left the firm, signing blank documents with
information to be filled in later, repeatedly missing
hearings without notifying other parties or the court, and
ignoring notarization requirements.333
327 See supra Section III.C.
328 See A Standing Question, supra note 17, at 711.
329 Id. at 710.
33 Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the
Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 971, 979
(2010).
331 Id. at 976-77.
332 See generally Robo-Litigation, supra note 22, at 888-90 (listing numerous
examples of misconduct by attorneys representing banks and servicers).
333 Id. at 869-70 (citations omitted).
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Yet, despite these many documented problematic practices, it
appears that recent jurisprudence clings to the notion that precluding a
bank or servicer's ability to collect on a loan is the most serious
equitable consideration courts face in foreclosure.334 This ignores the
pertinent and troubling issues of whether or not a bank or servicer is the
proper party to sue, is seeking unsubstantiated damages or charges, or
is bringing a claim when previous suits were dismissed for flagrant
misconduct.335
Even in cases specifically discussing acceleration, res judicata, and
statutes of limitation, banks and foreclosing entities behave
opportunistically and have done so for as long as cases have been
reported on such issues.33 6 Again, even though in these specific sub-
areas of foreclosure litigation jurisprudence, it is homeowners who are
not seen to have equity on their side.337 The expansion of the exceptions
to res judicata, the double dismissal rule, and statutes of limitation are
simply more evidence of the pervasive view among the judiciary that
equities in foreclosure cases only lie with banks and lenders.338
D. Inefficient Efficiency
As we have noted here and in previous research, judges and court
administrators seem to be wedded to the idea that speeding up
foreclosure cases is the only optimal policy.33 9 Yet, we have noted, this
approach, as with the other housing crisis issues driven largely by a
demand for faster results, is ultimately shortsighted.3 4' Although a
longer foreclosure process costs lenders and servicers more, these costs
may help incentivize servicers to settle more cases, rather than enduring
a long slog through the court system.341 Similarly, the longer time
period may assist borrowers in bolstering their financial resources or in
weathering a financial hardship, again making settlement more likely.342
Even if a more efficient foreclosure system were recognized as the
most important goal of foreclosure litigation, rather than fact finding,
the efficiency arguments are completely undercut by the factual
circumstances that give rise to the burgeoning foreclosure statute of
114 See Fairbank's Capital Corp. v. Milligan, 234 F. App'x 21, 24 (3d Cir. 2007);
Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1007-08 (Fla. 2004).
335 See supra text accompanying notes 318-19.
336 See supra text accompanying notes 305-06, 312-13.
337 See supra text accompanying notes 314-19.
338 See supra text accompanying notes 314-19.
339 Robo-Litigation, supra note 22, at 867.
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limitations jurisprudence.343 On one hand, we have noted that judges
may give little attention to borrower defenses or discovery because of
this unceasing drive for speed and efficiency in court systems. 344 On
the other hand, the mere fact that a foreclosure action faces a five-year
statute of limitations bar potentially signals a significant level of
incompetence, nonfeasance, or malfeasance on the part of banks and
their attorneys. A typical judicial state foreclosure may only produce
one or two witnesses and five to ten exhibits, and such trials typically
do not entail jury selection.345 It is unclear then, in this fact pattern, why
the efficiency argument would lie in favor of the party that was not
prepared for trial or had its case dismissed after years and years of
litigation.
Allowing banks to continuously refile these cases only incentivizes
the leisurely and cavalier manner in which their attorneys have
prosecuted actions in the past.346 If banks were certain that statute of
limitations defenses would apply in a dismissal of a cause proceeding
for longer than five years, one would expect banks to wait to file their
cases until absolutely ready to prosecute, and would not require more
than five years to obtain a judgment or dismissal.
Similarly, affording foreclosing banks the exceptions to claim
preclusion we have explored herein further incentivizes the shoddy
work that created such large numbers of dismissals.347 As with the
statute of limitations, if banks knew that they would not be able to bring
unlimited lawsuits, they would be less apt to file questionable suits
based on questionable documents that get dismissed and ultimately
waste the time and resources of the court and all parties. Ultimately,
however, it seems that the fact that a foreclosure case might take more
than five years is seen more as a result of homeowners' dilatory tactics
(which should not be rewarded), rather than incompetence on the part
of foreclosing entities (which for practical purposes is ignored when
creating exceptions for the statute of limitations and res judicata).348
141 See supra Section III.C.
144 See Allen, supra note 5; supra text accompanying note 294.
145 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 24.
346 See supra notes 332-33 and accompanying text.
341 See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Beauvais, 188 So. 3d 938, 969 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (Scales, J., dissenting) ("The expiration of a statute of
limitations, however, generally results in a windfall for the escaping defendant. In
my view, neither the moral imperative that borrowers pay their obligations, nor
Singleton, has abrogated decades of Florida jurisprudence governing the statute of
limitations in foreclosure cases.").
348 See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 16 (arguing
that the mass foreclosure docket has revealed judicial bias against mortgagors).
continued...
442 WAKE FOREST J. [VOL. 18
BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have described elsewhere the myriad of actors who either
ignored, downplayed, or incentivized problematic practices in
foreclosure litigation. 149 These include the government-sponsored
entities retaining attorneys for foreclosure based on speed ratings, state
bar associations ignoring misconduct for years, and state attorneys
general completing showpiece settlements with banks and servicers that
did not require substantial reforms.35 ° In theory, at least in judicial
foreclosure states, judges might be, or ought to be, the preeminent
disciplinarian in the foreclosure process. It is judges who see daily the
human misery in-part created by banks' lending policies leading up to
the Great Recession, and it is judges who see the questionable, and in
many cases, outrageous conduct in the prosecution of foreclosure
claims.35 I And it is only judges' orders, rulings, and jurisprudence that
could eliminate the most common malfeasance in foreclosure litigation.
Yet, we have posited here and in previous research that judges largely
previewed foreclosure cases to the detriment of borrowers, set up a
system to process foreclosure cases in a less scrutinizing fashion than
other comparable civil litigation that encourages that very previewing,
and have narrowed borrower defenses and expanded anti-bank
exceptions to longstanding rules.352
We note that the fact that a state provides judicial review of
foreclosures or is a power-of-sale state is a product of the state
legislature.353 We also note that the applicable statute of limitations is
created by the legislature.35 4 Yet, by individually previewing cases,
creating a system designed for efficiency rather than truth-seeking, and
downplaying debtor defenses while expanding exceptions for banks so
as to be meaningless, the judiciary in many instances has short-circuited
these legislative creations. Our findings lead us to believe that, if given
a choice, many judges overseeing foreclosure cases in judicial-
foreclosure jurisdictions would simply do away with the legislative
creation ofjudicial foreclosure altogether, and, to some extent, they may
already have substantively succeeded.
149 See, e.g., White, supra note 6, at 414.
350 See, e.g., A Standing Question, supra note 17, at 730.
351 Matt Taibbi, Invasion of the Home Snatchers, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 10,
2010), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/matt-taibbi-courts-helping-banks-
screw-over-homeowners-20101110.
352 See, e.g., A Standing Question, supra note 17, at 727.
313 See Alexander et al., supra note 63, at 342-43.
314 See FLA. STAT. § 95.281 (2017).
